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ABSTRACT
THE NEW RIGHT AND OZALISM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Aylin Topal
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
Supervisor: Prof Dr. Metin Heper
September 2000
This thesis serves for the aim of investigating the politics of the 1980s in 
Turkey by focusing on the policies and the ideology of the ANAP. This study 
aimed to examine the Turkish politics in the 1980s under the light of the New 
Right ideology. The ANAP seemed to be the advocator of the New Right 
ideology in Turkey. Both global and national environment of the 1970s 
necessitated a new form of politics for the solution of both economic and political 
problems. The ANAP was accepted as one particular response to the national and 
international crises of the 1970s. , ■T'.tAv,
Thatcherism and Reaganism are two significant examples that are agreed 
to be the practises of the New Right ideology. In order to explore the affinity 
between the Turkish, American and British practises in the 1980s, a kind of 
comparative analysis was necessary. I explored the basic characteristics of the 
New Right in the first place, then focused on the ANAP’s party structure, 
ideology, economic and political perspectives. Under the light of these, I turned to 
the international scale, and compared the Ozal government with Thatcher and 
Reagan governments.
Within the framework of above procedure, this thesis indicates that the 
practises of the 1980s in Turkey matches with the British and American practises 
and the ideology of the New Right to a certain extent. However, one cannot 
ignore some specific characteristics of the Turkish case which necessitated some 
changes in the ideology and practises.
Keywords: The New Right, Liberalism, Conservatism, Ozalism, Thatcherism, 
Reaganism.
ÖZET
YENİ SAĞ VE ÖZALİZM: KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BiR BAKIŞ
Aylin Topal
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Metin Heper
Eylül 2000
Bu tez, Türkiye’de 19801i yıllar politikalarını Yeni Sağ ideolojisi 
çerçevesinde, ANAP politika ve ideolojisi üzerinde odaklanarak araştırmayı 
amaçlamıştır. ANAP, Türkiye’de Yeni Sağ ideolojisinin temsilcisi olarak 
görünmektedir. 19701i yılllarm küresel ve ulusal atmosferi politik ve ekonomik 
problemlerin çözümü için yeni bir politika anlayışının gerekliliğini göstermiştir. 
ANAP 19701i yılların problemlerini çözmeyi vaadeden bir parti olarak Türkiye 
siyasal yaşantısında yerini almıştır.
Thatcherizm ve Reaganizm yazında Yeni Sağ ideolojisinin iki önemli 
örneği olarak kabul edilir. Türkiye, Amerika ve Ingiltere pratiklerinin birbirlerine 
olan yakınlıklarını açığa çıkarabilmek için karşılaştırmalı bir bakış gereklidir. Bu 
tezde Yeni Sağın temel özelliklerinin araştırılmasının ardından, ANAP’m parti 
yapısı, ideolojisi, ekonomik ve politik bakış açısı incelenmiştir, ilk iki bölümün 
ışığı altında, üçüncü bölümde, uluslararası düzleme dönülmüş ve Özal hükümeti, 
Thatcher ve Reagan hükümetleri ile karşılaştırılmıştır.
Yukarıda anlatılan yönlem çerçevesinde, bu çalışma 19801i yıllar Türkiye 
pratikleri, Ingilitere ve Amerika pratikleri ile ve Yani Sağ ideolojisi ile örtüşmeler 
gösterdiğini ortaya çıkarmıştır. Ancak Türkiye örneğinin bazı özellliklerinin Yeni 
Sağ ideolojisi ve pratiklerinde birtakım değişiklere neden olduğuda 
gözlemlenmiştir.
Anahtar Kelimeler; Yeni Sağ, Liberalizm, Muhafazakarlık, Özalizm, 
Teacherizm, Reaganizm.
To my parents, Hasan and Şerife
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Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
After a relatively social democratic phase, political power in the West shifted to 
parties of the Right with the coming of the 1980s. Ronald Reagan (1981) in the 
United States, Margaret Thatcher (1979) in Britain, Helmut Kohl (1982) in 
Germany and Jacques Chirac (1981) in France were partly conservatives and partly 
liberals when the core cadre of the parties is the main focus. In the 1980s several 
students of politics turned their attention to these countries. They tried to figure out 
and conceptualise the policies of these leaders’ governments during which 
significant changes had occurred. Generally, the ideological centre of gravity of 
the New Right was in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In the 1980s, the New Right 
ideas shaped Turkish politics to a certain extent. The Motherland Party seemed to 
be an advocate of the New Right ideology. These ideas continued to affect political 
debates and the policies after the demise of the Ozal administration. No other 
Turkish Prime Minister has had his name used in the way Ozal has. Ozalism has
been used widely to refer to name the policies of the 1980s and 1990s. This alone 
justifies this study and makes it important since it throws a light on contemporary 
political developments too.
Some argue that Islamism in Turkey constitutes a strong essence of conservatism, 
and with the emergence of the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, hereafter 
ANAP), a discourse of liberalism too, was integrated into Turkish conservatism. 
The ANAP had a significant faction, for the members of which religion was quite 
important. In this study, I investigate liberalism and conservatism as dimensions of 
the politics of the ANAP. I dwell on the question of political liberalism and 
conservatism of the ANAP of the 1980s. Also I will inquire to what extent this 
particular mixture of liberalism and conservatism resembles those of the New 
Right one comes across in the West. The circumstances that defined the ANAP 
were not only national; they were also global. Therefore, understanding the ANAP 
particularly, the politics of the 1980s in general, requires knowledge of the world 
political economy as well as knowledge of national political economic structures. 
This study investigates the politics of the 1980s in Turkey, focusing on the ANAP 
as one particular response to the political and economic crises of the 1970s, both 
global and national and compares this particular case with the British and 
American cases as they are referred to in the literature as the New Right.
In the First Chapter, I take up and try to explore some basic dimensions of political 
liberalism, political conservatism, and the New Right. In the second Chapter, I
study the ANAP’s liberalism and conservatism in the 1980s. In the third Chapter I 
discuss to what extent the ANAP’s mixture of liberalism and conservatism 
resembled the New Right in the West. In the fourth and the last chapter, I offer 
some concluding observations.
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, POLITICAL CONSERVATISM, AND THE NEW RIGHT
Although it is a sort of response to the changed circumstances of the world 
economy and national economies together with a philosophy sophisticated in the 
works of Frederick Hayek and Milton Friedman, the New Right represents an 
uneasy mixture of the nineteenth-century liberalism based on a rational, benefit 
maximiser, autonomous individual and traditional conservatism based on 
authority, and tradition driven society. The strands in the New Right are often 
called as neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism. In this study I have preferred to 
trace the New Right as a whole, but not totally compact. There are liberals and 
conservatives in the New Right; however, liberals have conservative ideas and 
conservatives have liberals notions. Thus, neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism are 
only the parts of a whole, therefore, to understand the whole the New Right would 
be better. For this reason neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism should be analysed 
under the title of the New Right. To what extent neo-liberalism and neo­
conservatism are new and different from their old versions? Therefore, a 
discussion of the basic characteristics of both liberalism and conservatism, as the
first step of my study, helps to give a better understanding of the evolution of the 
ideologies in the New Right.
Basic Characteristics o f  Liberalism
The Enlightenment is the origin of the full and experimental use of reason in 
human affairs. The intellectuals of the Enlightenment believed that society could 
improve by actions of rational man. This necessarily bears the claim of 
universalism (Eatwell, 1989: 14). With arguments based on ‘reason’, political 
authority was questioned. The 1820s and 1830s witnessed the blossoming of 
liberal ideology. In British and European thought, the heyday of liberalism 
coincided with the growth of industrialisation and the expansion of markets in 
goods, capital and labour. Liberalism had its longest period of effective political 
and economic activity in Britain in the shape of the Liberal Party from the 1840s 
onwards until 1922 (Vincent, 1992: 32). Indeed, there is not a pure doctrine of 
liberalism, and that there are some core ideas that appear differently in the writings 
of different thinkers. The main themes of the liberal ideas are individualism, 
individual rights and liberties and limited and balanced government.
Liberalism is founded on individualism which implies that the individual is prior to 
society. In the classical liberal thought, the desires and interests of the individual 
are given top priority. Reason is instrumental to the achievement of one’s goals
that s/he knows best. In liberal thinking, there are no institutions judging 
individuals and no morality or doctrine constraining the individual. Hence, 
liberalism implies extensive individual autonomy (Vincent, 1992; 32).
Classical liberalism calls for minimal or limited government (Gray, 1986: 70); the 
latter is justified by the proposed prosperity that economies deliver most 
successfully when they are not interfered with by governments. Liberal 
government must be a limited but an active government. The safeguarding of 
freedom of conscience, freedom of occupational choice, privacy and family rights 
should keep governments busy (Ryan, 1992: 307). Market mechanisms are 
considered superior to state regulation as a promoter of both economic prosperity 
and of the individual freedom through the limiting of the state intervention. 
Freedom must be market-based rather than state-imposed. Public institutions 
should be designed to maximise individual freedom.
Basic Characteristics o f  Conservatism
Conservatism is simply based on the idea of conserving, of keeping something 
from deterioration. Although this idea dates back to the fourteenth century, the 
political usage of the term emerged following the French Revolution, and in the 
early 1800s, especially with Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in 
France. Conservatism emerged at the same time with liberalism and socialism. As
a doctrine, conservatism has always been characterised by its emphasis upon 
authority, hierarchy, and balance, which are required for the establishment and 
maintenance of social order (Ryan, 1992: 63). The existence of a transcendental 
moral order, to which we ought to conform, is the basic assumption of the 
conservative ideology (Muller, 1997: 4). Conservatives have always been critical 
of the individualism of liberal doctrine because liberalism is taken to stand for the 
removal of all kinds of restraints over individual freedom. That is because 
conservatives believe that if the individual is left alone without any constraint, it 
can lead to the erosion of essential institutions that promote social order. 
Therefore, in conservatism, the main stress has been on community rather than on 
the individual.
Conservatism should not be understood as simple acceptance of the institutional 
status-quo·, indeed, it arises from the possible danger coming from radical change 
or by proposed reforms by the dominant political actors. Therefore, conservatism 
rather than being an inherent theory in defence of particular institutions, is a 
positional ideology. Its position may change according to the values it aims to 
conserve. The very term conservation implies the presence of something to 
conserve, but what if the desired values and/or structures have changed in time? 
Then conservatism first aims at a controlled change through the consolidation of 
the aimed situation and only after that it defends the conservation of the newly 
formed values and structures.
VARIATIONS ON THE NEW RIGHT
The New Right has been conceptualised differently by different scholars. That is 
because the New Right is not a clear project and therefore is open to different 
interpretations. There are a number of approaches to the New Right, often with 
reference to ‘Thatcherism’ and ‘Reaganism’. I now summarise these views to 
show the varying nature of the New Right
Andrew Gamble (1988) sees the New Right as a tool to solve the political as well 
as economic crisis of the late 1970s. According to him, the hard-core of the New 
Right parties was the conservatives who made the political decisions. Although the 
New Right contained two strands (liberalism and conservatism), the conservatives 
were much more influential in the policies. Paul Taylor (1989; 1992) and Bob 
Jessop (1984) approach the case with significant economic tendencies. They 
identify the period with economic constraint: the international political economy 
that entered a period of relative stagnation in the 1970s. Therefore, the New Right 
economic policies were seen as the only choice to overcome the continuing 
economic crisis. In the 1970s, with the effect of the economic crisis, the post-war 
welfare state order collapsed. As the representatives of both right and left argue, 
although in different terms, one of the primary reasons of the crisis was the 
incompatibility between the interest of capital and labour. The solution of the New
Right came as an attack to trade unions for the benefit of capital. David Coates 
(1989: 113) notes that, the New Right ideology was used as a tool to ‘attack on 
trade unions as a crucial constraint on the operation of the market ...(and)... 
balance between class forces in the interest of capital’. As different from the prices 
and incomes policy of the post-war era, which meant inclusion of the unions in to 
economic management and controlling inflation, the New Right relied heavily on 
the marginalisation of trade unions. Thatcher government, for instance, acted 
through step by step legislation, in order to further restrict union freedoms (Coxall, 
1998: 234-235). The ultimate aim was to transform trade unions into workplace 
representatives instead of organised interest groups acting in behalf of a class.
Stuart Hall is one of the most important and first theorists of the New Right 
ideology. He claims that policy changes are the results of the change in the 
hegemonic project, and in the British case, the 1980s witnessed the hegemonic 
project of the New Right ideology. He directs the attention to a series of ‘moral 
panic’ around seemingly non-political issues such as race, moral order, and 
permissiveness. Therefore, he defined the project more with reference to the non­
political and non-economic spheres. He calls the hegemonic project of the New 
Right as ‘authoritarian populism’ (1988:115-24). Valerie L. Scatamburlo (1998), 
also sees the New Right as an hegemonic project, ‘securing its hegemony over 
public opinion on red-button issues by manipulating the realm of cultural politics’. 
According to Wolfe (1991: 237), ‘ideology shapes institutions and outcomes; so
the transformation of ideas and practises in the ‘Thatcher’ [and surely ‘Reagan’] 
period was underpinned by New Right ideology.
The New Right was predominantly an economic project bolstered with political 
policies which aimed at constructing its hegemony in the 1980s. The objective of 
the New Right was to diffuse into every side of life. Therefore, in addition to 
political and economic ones, it was a cultural strategy as well. Besides economic 
and political re-structuring, by the way of cultural re-structuring, the New Right 
desired to rule less by force than by consent.
As the above sections clarify, the New Right is a mixture of two centuries-long 
political philosophies. However, and expectedly, this mixture is not an easy one 
since it is exposed to internal and mutual ambiguities of each philosophy. The 
following section attempts at helping to illuminate such points.
CONTRADICTIONS OF LIBERALISM AND CONSERVATISM
Liberalism and conservatism, as two pillars of the doctrine seem to contradict each 
other on several important issues; including the role attributed to the state; the 
rights and responsibilities of the individual; the nature and scope of individual 
freedom; and the importance of religious and familial values in society.
The combination of a traditional liberal defence of free economy with a traditional 
conservative defence of the state authority is the most distinctive feature of the 
New Right. Desmond King (1987) and Andrew Gamble (1988) argue that the idea 
of free economy combined with strong state presents a paradox. Indeed, the 
contradiction between liberalism and conservatism in defining the role of the state 
is apparent. As noted before, liberalism implies a limited government, whereas 
conservatism requires a strong state to maintain political order and social order. 
“The state is to be simultaneously rolled back and rolled forward. Non­
interventionist and decentralised in economic areas, the state is to be highly 
interventionist and centralised in others” (Gamble, 1988: 35). This issue has been 
the bone of contention between conservatives and liberals. John Gray (1993: 3), a 
famous conservative scholar, criticised Margaret Thatcher's government by 
claiming that what was needed was certainly not a minimum government but 
instead a limited state with significant positive responsibilities. It was the vital 
responsibility of a government to facilitate the transmission of valuable cultural 
traditions across the generations while, at the same time, to nurture and enrich the 
under-girding common culture. According to conservatives, as a result of the 
policies pursuing the idea that in the conditions of a modern society, only market 
institutions can give practical realisation to the values of liberty and human 
dignity, we face the danger of civil society being further weakened by the 
metamorphosis of the state itself into an enterprise association (Gray, 1993: 45).
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One of the most important premises of liberal thinking is the belief that 
emancipation of man from the religious and traditional bonds of the social order 
will bring progress. On the other hand, the basic emphasis of conservatism is on 
tradition. Consequently, there is a stress on the values of community, kinship, 
hierarchy, authority, and religion. Conservatives claim that society turns into a 
chaotic situation once individuals turn a blind eye to these values by the forces of 
liberalism and radicalism (Nispet, 1986: 8).
Liberals and conservatives differ in their perception of capitalism: Liberals value 
industrialisation as the basis of ‘progress’ and facilitator of increased happiness in 
society. On the other hand, as Nispet (1986: 11) claims, “conservatism is the child 
of the Industrial and French revolutions: unintended and unwanted, hated by the 
protagonist of each, but the child nevertheless”. Extreme forms of conservatives 
are against democracy, technology and secularism that these two revolutions both 
gave importance to and helped to articulate. Conservatives prefer strict hierarchy, 
inequality, authority, and the tenets of the pre-industrial social order.
Conservatives are clearly critical of liberalism because it is for complete individual 
freedom. Conservatives argue that the individual has not only rights and freedoms 
but also responsibilities toward the society: “Thus the state cannot be ‘minimised’ 
in the way that liberals suggest: it must guarantee law, order and the preservation 
of the countiy’s freedom” (Suvanto, 1997: 142-143). As it has been succinctly put, 
“liberalism and conservatism contradict each other; they appear mutually
11
exclusive; liberal’s concern with liberty, freedom and progress does not correspond 
with conservatives’ emphasis upon organic unity of society and the state, 
hierarchy, and the negative consequences of economic activity (King, 1987; 24).
At this point there arises an important question; In spite of many contradictions, 
how can the unity of liberalism and conservatism in political practise be 
explained? It is now in order to turn to this question.
THE NEW RIGHT AS THE HEGEMONIC IDEOLOGY OF THE 1980s
Seeds of the New Right go back to the 1870s. In the 1870s, the three schools of 
economics -Austria, Virginia and Chicago- strove for the resolution of the crisis of 
classical theory by applying neo-classical economic theory. Carl Menger is known 
as an important figure in both philosophical and theoretical formation of the New 
Right with his publication Principles o f Economics in 1871. In the 1970s, the New 
Right entered the political and economic area by promising to solve the ongoing 
economic crises. In spite of the discussed internal divisions and conflicts, the New 
Right ideology had a hegemonic character during the 1980s. Although traditional 
liberalism and traditional conservatism have serious contradiction on several 
issues, the ideology of the New Right represents sort of an evolution of both 
liberalism and conservatism. Therefore, the New Right should not be considered as 
a mere alignment of these ideologies.
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The proposed role for the state differentiates liberals of the New Right from 
traditional liberals and conservatives of the New Right from traditional 
conservatives. Liberals in the New Right propose that some state intervention can 
be justified and moreover necessary for public good. The economic situation is 
considered as constantly changing and had no specific direction and end. This new 
role of the state in regard to the market is because of the new conception of human 
nature.
There is a difference between the understanding of human nature in traditional 
liberalism and liberalism of the New Right because of the conservative inputs. 
According to Hayek, who is a scholar of enormous importance for the New Right, 
human nature is anti-rational; therefore, while, trying to leave the market to its own 
devices, there was a strong attack on the planned economy. That is because, 
planning by definition implies a reason-based activity. The liberal position shares 
with conservatism a distrust to reason to the extent that a liberal is very much 
aware that we do not know all the answers and that he is not sure that the answers 
he has are certainly the right ones or even that we can find all the answers (Hayek, 
1960: 406). There must be only a fine-tuning between the state and the economy. 
Thus, in the New Right, there is no notion such as the perfect order of the market. 
The individual should be free to act in the market but this does not mean the 
market is free from any control since individual cannot know the certain solution 
of each problem. State is there to correct the market imperfections whenever it is
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crucial; therefore, it does imply considerably more intervention than liberal 
economic principles, obviously less intervention than what the Keynesian Welfare 
State propose. The New Right advocators argued that the programmes of both 
social democrats and socialists had been discredited by experience. As the state 
became more and more interventionist so the authority of government became 
progressively weaker against powerful trade unions and the other sectional interest. 
In order words, foundations of social and public order were undermined and 
authoritarian means were seen to be the only ways for their restoration (Gamble, 
1988: 35). The task of government is to create a framework within which 
individual and groups can successfully pursue their respective ends, and sometimes 
to use its coercive power of raising revenue to provide services which for one 
reason or another the market cannot supply (Hayek, 1979: 139). The major goal 
was privatisation, that is moving as much as possible from the public to the private 
sector.
Planning, according to Hayek, is a kind of sin. He believed that social institutions 
and practices are largely unplanned, and successfully evolved and survived 
because they benefit those who adopt them. “Social institutions are the result of 
human action not of human design. Language and the market are examples of 
unplanned yet structured institutions that follow certain rules. A successful society 
-what Hayek described as “the Great Society” -  will be one that identifies and 
follows the best rules” (Ashford, 1993:26). Traditions, rules, and institutions are
14
the product of evolution not of human mind, but of “a spontaneous order” which 
benefit members of a particular society.
The most important point in adaptation of liberalism and conservatism is drawing a 
fine line between a limited state and a strong government. While conservatives 
seek a strong centralised government to maintain social order and hierarchical 
authority and strengthen the familial values, liberals seek a limited and weak state, 
leaving the market to its own mechanisms so as to provide maximum benefit for 
individuals which were characterised as the rational keeper of their interests. 
Therefore, the New Right necessitates, on the one hand, liberal arguments about 
the desirability of a ‘spontaneous social order’ created and maintained by the 
operation of free markets and about the need for only a minimal ‘night-watchman’ 
state to police that order, and on the other hand, conservative argument about the 
desirability of stability, continuity and ‘good order’ and about the need for a 
strong, authoritative and vigorously assertive state.
In order to clarify the possible confusion between the terms government and state, 
let us go into details of the specific characteristic of the state in the New Right 
project. In the literature, some writers use the term government and state 
interchangeably, therefore, it sometimes becomes confusing. In this paper, I shall 
use the following categorisation. In the first place, state should be evaluated in 
relation to three separate but not distinct spheres: the social, political, and the 
economic. When the relation between the state and society on which the hegemony
15
is built is considered, the New Right theorists generally use the term ‘government’. 
Passing to the relation between the state and the market they use the term ‘state’. 
While, government is referred to as regulating social and political relations of 
people through which law and order are significantly stressed; state is understood 
as the sort of entity getting involved in the economic relations among the members 
of society, thus something that should be sealed. In this respect, we can say that, in 
the New Right, while government is conceptualised in conventional conservative 
terrain, state is perceived and theorised more in individualist liberal terrain. The 
key doctrine of the New Right on which all strands agreed, and the political project 
it has inspired is, therefore, the doctrine of free economy and strong government.
Shared Critiques
Both strands within the New Right rejected many of the ideas, practises and 
institutions that had been supported and practised by the previous policy makers. 
The New Right theorists, both liberals and conservatives, criticised the Welfare 
State for its economic burden on the political power. The Welfare State practices 
on the one hand, had enabled political power involvement in economy and on the 
other hand it had bolstered the chronic budget deficits and state debts. A short-term 
solution, printing money, had become the only choice of the political power. The 
major criticism was that via practises of the Keynesian Welfare State the economic 
sphere had become politicised and the stability had been damaged by the political
16
power. Welfare expenses demand a huge budget, and taxation is an important item 
in the budget income. Nevertheless, the Welfare State takes the responsibility of 
the welfare expenses without demanding a fiscal policy (Buchanan and Wagner, 
1987:399). For this reason welfare states are destined to go into deep economic 
crises.
In order to overcome these crises, states either run debts or start printing money or 
both. Neither of these two solutions can be applied in normal conditions and 
whenever they are applied the inevitable result is inflation and instability. Both 
stands of the New Right shared the critiques towards the Welfare State policies and 
as a political program. The New Right was closely identified with the opposition to 
state involvement in the economy, unless it turned out to be a must to remedy the 
imperfections in the market.
Liberalism and conservatism as being two pillars of the New Right ideology gain 
much from the other, and, actually, this gives a sort of strength to the project. The 
hidden assumption of the New Right is that conservatism provides a set of residual 
claims to compensate for the negative consequences of pursuing liberal policies. In 
other words, social-ness of conservatism is taken as the antidote for the fatal 
consequences of individualism. For example, as public welfare services by the 
state are reduced in accordance with the liberal objectives, traditional roles of 
women and families, which are strongly defended by conservatives become 
important.
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Conservatives criticised the welfare state because of its moral implications, in 
particular, with its impact on the familial norms, traditional social values and its 
encouragement of feminism. The New Right conservatives argue that the state 
provision of welfare erodes the family’s traditional role. The New Right 
emphasised the importance of the family as the main economic and social unit in 
society (King, 1987: 25). Therefore, the understanding of dual-actor can be spoken 
of The main stress is on the individual in the market with the effect of liberal 
understanding and the main actor is the family in the society with the effect of the 
conservatives. Authority and discipline must also be reasserted in schools and in 
families.
In sum, to overcome the economic crisis of Keynesian state, the capitalist system 
went into a process of re-structuring. Conservatives have appropriated the liberal 
ideas of the market order and free economy. They adapted them to the 
requirements of conservative discourse about society and politics. Rather than 
being both liberal and conservative, the New Right was predominantly a 
conservative movement.
At this point one may oppose this idea by claiming that how can a ‘predominantly 
conservative movement’ propose a complete change in the institutions. The answer 
would be found in the words of Wolfe: ‘’Thatcherites’, driven by the New Right 
ideology, developed a coherent policy on privatisation in opposition, which they
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carried out in power. In fact, they adapted a step-by-step approach; that the growth 
in their commitment to privatisation in opposition and in the early days of power 
was slow but sure” (Wolfe, 1991; 240).
What conservatives believe is a matter of what they want to conserve and who 
threatens it. Indeed, conservatives in the United States and in Britain wanted to 
conserve the political system and ideology of liberals. The term ‘liberal- 
conservatism’ may well suit the case, because, it is the conservatives who have 
been affected by the revival of the neo-liberal political economy, that market 
economy depends on the socially responsible citizens. Eatwell (1989) sums up the 
main characteristics of the conservative notion in the New Right as follows;
1. Conservative and perhaps authoritarian doctrines concerning the nature 
of civil society, with emphasis on custom, tradition and allegiance as social 
bonds; 2. doctrines of political obligation framed in terms of obedience, 
legitimacy, and piety rather than contract, consent, and justice; 3. 
reluctance to countenance too great a divorce between law and morality -  
i.e. between enactments of the state, and the sentiments of society, hence a 
resistance to liberalising reforms in the law; 4. cultural conservatism; 5 
respect for the hereditary principle and prescriptive rights; 6. belief in 
private property, not as a natural right, but as an indispensable part of the 
condition of society; 7. belief in elementary freedoms, and in the 
irreplaceable value of the individual as against the collective; 8. belief in 
free enterprise and a capitalist economy, as the only mode of production 
compatible with human freedom, and suited to the temporary nature of 
human aspirations; 9. varying degrees of belief in human imperfectability 
and original sin (Eatwell, 1989; 47-48).
Although important differences seem to exist between neo-liberalism and neo­
conservatism, there are important similarities between them. Both strands aimed to 
maintaining a system of inequality; which is in the market for neo-liberals, and in
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the social stratification for the neo-conservatives. The neo-conservatives’ emphasis 
on personal responsibility goes hand in hand with the neo-liberal attack on welfare 
rights: “Neo-conservatives have given neo-liberals a conception of nationhood and 
value of duties and obligations, while neo-liberals have taught neo-conservatives 
the value of markets” (Harris, 1998: 62). Both see danger in the politicisation of 
the social order that can be threatened by organised social classes. In sum, while 
neo-liberals focus on the policies and decisions on the market, neo-conservatives 
work with a heavily social and particularly cultural conception of the individual.
In sum no matter how often evident theoretical inconsistencies are identified in the 
New Right arguments, these have succeeded in providing a policy sufficiently 
coherent to enjoy electoral and political success. In the New Right policies, rolling 
back to the state in some areas have been accompanied with the expansion in some 
others. The conceptualisation of limited government and a strong state would solve 
this seemingly contradictory issue and moreover the relationship between these 
two tendencies is best explained in terms of the social effects of rapid privatisation 
and diffusion of market practices in the welfare state. Institutions like family, 
religion, and charity foundations promoted by conservative view fill the gap 
created by the reduction of state while leaving the individual alone via liberal 
practices, and thus soften the negative consequences of this reduction (Aksoy, 
1995). Conceptualisation of strong government, emphasising social order and 
moral values, as an antidote for the social effects of the end of the welfare services 
makes the New Right politically successful.
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The methodology of the New Right in constructing its own frames and posing its 
criticisms is the evaluation of the political and economic history of the world with 
polar terms, real/imaginary, right/wrong, or white/black. From this categorisation, 
then the New Right holyfies itself as the unique scientific approach. If one accepts 
the categorisation of the New Right, then the criticism could only be partial and 
these could only be related with the (wrong) practices of the New Right model. 
Other practises like fascist, socialist and even social democratic practises 
conducted in the 1970s and even before that, according to the theorists of the New 
Right, were totalitarian in origin, utopian and unscientific. Therefore, Pekel 
(1994:22) claims that the New Right is one of the purest examples of the 
“scientific despotism”.
The success of the New Right is not because it provided a new and effective 
theoretical view, or solutions to the problems of the era. On the contrary, it is 
because of its theoretical structure which legitimises the insensitivity towards 
systemic problems and normalises living with those problems and more 
importantly the New Right takes the attention from the system itself the source of 
the problems and directs the criticisms to the individual policies. These features are 
the gifts of conservatism to the New Right because the political and the social are 
defined within the confines of conservative notions, the economic sphere is tried 
to be restructured with reference to liberal understanding under the shadow of 
conservatism.
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Liberals in the New Right regard themselves as modern classical liberals. 
Likewise, conservatives prefer to define their understanding as modern 
conservatism. Modern classical liberalism and modern conservatism at first glance 
seems to be paradoxical nonetheless, "j^e essence that brings modern and classical 
together makes the politics of the 1980s as “new”. “[W]hat gives the New Right a 
unity and helps to distinguish it from previous ‘rights’ is the combination of a 
traditional liberal defence of the free economy with a traditional conservative 
defence of state authority” (Gamble, 1998: 35-36).
The New Right ideas seem to shape Turkish politics to a certain extent. In the 
coming chapter Turkish politics in the 1980s will be maintained.
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Chapter Two
ТЫЕ 1980s: RESTRUCTURING TURKEY
Throughout Turkish political history, one comes across important turning points 
which were particularly intensified after 1950. Before 1950, a long-lasting rule of 
the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- CHP) left its mark on 
Turkish politics. However, after the 1945 elections, which meant a shift to the 
multi-party system, the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti-DP) became the victor of 
the 1950 elections. The ten-year long DP government shook the previously 
structured position of the military and eventually, in 1960, DP was removed from 
the political power by a military take-over. Following this, the second military 
intervention but this time an indirect one occurred in 1971, and the Demirel 
government was forced to resign. The decade of the 1980s witnessed a crucial 
turning point in Turkey’s socio-economic and political structure. At the heart of 
this socio-economic transformation, there lie the January 24, 1980 economic 
measures, followed by the September 12, 1980 coup d ’etat and following the
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November 1983 elections, the emergence of ANAP as the ruling party. The 
parliamentary, military, semi-military and once again, parliamentary regimes 
which followed each other during these years represented striking continuities with 
respect to the basic economic policy orientations (Boratav, 1990: 199) and political 
policies.
When Turkish politics is considered, generally a ten-year-periodisation is being 
used; pre-1950, the 1950s, the 1960s, the 1970s, the 1980s and the 1990s. At the 
very beginning of each decade -with the exception of the 1990- interestingly there 
occurred a fundamental change if not an attempt to change the political structure of 
Turkey. In the literature, the 1980s is generally labelled and evaluated starting with 
the 12“’ of September, however, this study shall start with examining the 1980s 
stating with 24“* of January. That is because, the impetus of the change in the 
Turkish politics in the 1980s was not the military intervention as suggested by 
many scholars, it was the January 24 the economic program. By claiming this, I do 
not mean to underestimate the significance of the military intervention, but the 
January 24, 1980 economic decisions, September 12, 1980 military intervention, 
and November 6, 1983 general election and the rest of the decade should be 
considered as a kind of continuity rather than breaks. The main objective of this 
chapter is to make an analysis of the events of the 1980s with a special emphasis 
on the political liberalism and conservatism of the Motherland Party with some 
necessary references to the January 24, 1980 economic decisions and military 
intervention.
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Pre-1980 Period
In the first place it is essential to have a look at the economic policies of the 1970s, 
because the 1980s was not realised in a vacuum-like situation, but both internal 
and external factors in the preceding period affected the conditions of the 1980s. 
After the mid-1960s, Turkey’s traditional industrialisation strategy was based on 
an import substitution strategy through protectionist policies. Because of the low 
levels of export, foreign exchange stocks became a bottleneck. After the oil shocks 
of the 1970s, this system became problematic. During the 1970s, Turkey faced the 
worst political and socio-economical crises of its republican history. Such crises 
included social unrest, political violence, paralysis of the state bureaucracy and 
other institutions, foreign exchange problems, growing foreign debt, negative 
economic grovW;h, high inflation and unemployment, a series of shortages, and 
alarming trade and balance of payments deficits (Eralp, Tiinay and Yeçilada, 1993; 
1). In a general evaluation of the industrialisation programs, Albert Hirschman 
(1968) foresees and evaluates these crises as the ‘crisis of the import substitution 
industrialisation’ which is called as a “difficult phase”. Towards the end of the 
1970s Turkey encountered a major debt problem and became the first major 
developing country to face a resulting debt payment crisis (Celasun and Rodrik, 
1989: 193).
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Among significant external factors responsible for Turkey’s economic problems, 
sudden increases in oil prices in 1973 and 1979 can be cited. One can argue that 
the economic problems had begun with the 1973 oil crisis that caused a drastic 
increase in the petroleum import expenditure. However, the oil crisis can only be a 
part of the existing internal economic problems.
In the preceding years, economic policies had been considered as inconsistent, 
unstable and irrational. Various ad hoc adjustments were made in order to achieve 
sustainable growth and prevent worsening debt problem. These adjustment policies 
which had been undertaken in accordance with two stand-by arrangements with the 
IMF (April 1978 and July 1979) were maxi-devaluations in 1978 and 1980 and 
measures to restrict imports. However in time, it was realised that those policies 
were not sufficient to solve the balance-of-payments and other macroeconomic 
problems. Therefore, immediate and substantial reforms were to be made.
January 24, 1980 Economic Program
On January 24, 1980, a series of economic policy changes, which were under the 
control and guidance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), were introduced 
by the last civilian government of the 1970s, headed by Süleyman Demirel to 
achieve a restructuring of the economy. Turgut Özal, who at the time was a top- 
bureaucrat in the State Planning Organisation, was considered as being the
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architect of the economic measures adopted. This stabilisation program received 
immediate recognition and support from international organisations like IMF and 
the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). The economic policy changes included strong macroeconomic 
stabilisation measures, with the help of fundamental reforms. The short-term 
objectives of these reforms were to reduce the rate of inflation, improve the 
balance-of-payments through rapid export-growth, and re-establish Turkey’s 
international credit-worthiness. Although short-term objectives of the program 
were announced, there were no specific plans and timetables for the long-term 
objectives of privatising of the state economic enterprise and liberalising foreign 
trade and payments.
In order to achieve these objectives the following measures were to be adopted: (1) 
a realistic and flexible exchange rate policy; (2) more effective export promotion 
measures to encourage rapid export-growth; (3) gradual import liberalisation, 
including the dismantling of quantitative restrictions and the rationalisation of the 
tariff structure; (4) improved external debt management and information systems; 
(5) tight monetary controls and discipline to restrain domestic absorption and 
reduce the rate of the inflation; (6) deregulation of interest rates to encourage 
private savings; (7) rationalisation of the public investment program; (8) a greater 
role for the private sector by encouraging privatisation and limiting the range of 
sectors dominated by public enterprises; (9) reform of the State Economic 
Enterprises (SEEs) to reduce their burden on the budget and improve their
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efficiency, (10) steps to improve institutional efficiency in key sector (Baysan, 
Blitzer, 1990: 11).
The Demirel government could not implement the economic program, since it 
lacked the necessary instruments. Because the January 24 economic program 
necessitated difficult measures and policies which were so harsh that Demirel 
government could not dare to pursue them because of fear of losing its public 
support in the coming election. Only after the 1980, objectives of the economic 
program could be pursued. The military came to the political stage and removed 
the handicaps over the implementation of the economic program. Ozal, became the 
director of the economy not only in practice but also formally.
This adjustment program was implemented in three stages. During the first stage in 
1980-1981, the aim was to achieve some degree of economic stability by adopting 
fiscal and monetary policies and emphasising export-oriented growth. In the 
second stage, 1982-1983, the government tried to maintain the climate of 
economic stability and to set relative price realignment. Finally, the third stage 
started with the transition to ‘civilian rule’ in November 1983 and, under the 
leadership of Turgut Ozal, and continued until the 1987 general elections. During 
the last stage, the ANAP government emphasised deeper liberalisation of trade and 
monetary regimes by adopting the 1980 liberalisation program (Ye§ilada and 
Fusunoglu, 1992:191). This economic program therefore, could be pursued and 
even developed until 1987 without any interruption.
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This program which was introduced as alternative-less and indispensable, was not 
unique and specific to Turkey. Targets and solutions offered in the model resemble 
the stabilisation policy package of the IMF for the underdeveloped countries under 
economic crises in the 1970s and the structural adjustment program of the World 
Bank (Boratav, 1988:122).
September 12,1980 Military Intervention
Both the political and economic crises of the late 1970s, paved the way for the 
third military intervention of Turkey in September 12, 1980. The military came to 
power with two overriding objectives, the first one was to tame the political 
environment by applying harsh measures against extremists and the second 
objective was for economic restructuring. The military aimed to pursue the January 
24 decisions which had not been succeeded between January and September of 
that year. It is quite interesting and illustrative that the Chief of General Staff 
Kenan Evren, in one of his first speeches after the intervention, pinpointed that in 
the 1970s the wages had been very high and this had created some problems. 
Economic problems of the 1970s were considered seriously by the military, and 
economic restructuring was an objective to succeed together with the political one 
(Boratav, 1988:122). For the success of both of these objectives, the intervenors 
decided to prepare a new constitution. The 1982 Constitution and the presidency of
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the General Kenan Evren were approved by a referendum in 1982. “Perhaps the 
single most important difference between the Turkish Constitution of 1961 and 
1982 can be summarised as follows: the latter opted for a much less participant and 
pluralist version of democracy compared the former” (Ozbudun, 1991; 41). The 
military as can be deduced from the above quotation, aimed at solving the political 
crises by creating the blueprint of an apolitical society. “Although the 1982 
Constitution recognise[d] basic associational freedoms [that is, the right to form 
associations and trade unions], such freedoms ...[were] hedged with so many 
qualifications that they ... [could] hardly be expected to permit a vigorous and truly 
pluralistic associational life” (Ozbudun, 1991: 42). The head of the state. General 
Kenan Evren, openly stated the objective of the military in preparing the 
Constitution in his speech for the Public introduction of the Constitution:
The new Constitution lays down a principle valid for all institutions. Each 
institution, whether a party, a school, or a professional organisation, should 
remain in its own functionally specific area. In other words, a party will 
function as a party, an association as an association, a foundation as a 
foundation, and a trade union as a trade union. Political activity is reserved 
for political parties. No institution which is not organised as a political 
party may engage in political activity. On the other hand, political parties 
should not interfere in areas reserved for trade unions, associations, 
professional organisations and foundations. Every institution will function 
within its own framework (Evren, 1982 cited in Ozbudun, 1991; 42-43).
As it can be deduced from the above quotation, the spheres of political and 
economic struggle were completely distinctly conceptualised by the military in the 
1982 Constitution. Therefore, they could not reside in the same sphere. One of the
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basic characteristics of the 1980s is the compartmentalisation of the economic and 
political domains.
For the purpose of restructuring the political sphere, new legislation modifying the 
party formation and political activities were put into effect*. Since they were 
blamed for polarisation of the political system during the 1970s, the leaders and 
the parliamentarians of all the parties that existed before 12 September, 1980 were 
banned from politics for ten and five years respectively. The military was 
searching for a means to establish long-term political stability in Turkey. 
Therefore, the military leadership of the 1980-1983 period set out to create a new 
party system, attempting to make a clean break with the past (Turan, 1991:80).
1983 GENERAL ELECTIONS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE MOTHERLAND PARTY
Shortly after the ban was repealed on May 16, 1983, several new parties emerged 
in the Turkish political scene. Two of these, the Nationalist Democracy Party 
(Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi- MDP) led by General Turgut Sunalp and the 
Populist Party (Halkçı Parti- HP) under Necdet Calp, were formed with the 
encouragement of the generals. The MDP was a party of the centre-right and the 
latter of the centre-left. A third party, the Motherland Party was established under 
the leadership of Turgut Özal, who, as noted, had been in charge of formulating
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and implementing the economic stabilisation program and austerity measures 
demanded and aided by the IMF. He was, first, under-secretary in the Justice Party 
government during the period immediately preceding the military coup and then 
served as Deputy Prime Minister for nearly two years under the military regime. 
Because of his close relations with international monetary institutions, promotion 
of Turgut Ozal to his new post was quite expected.
The November 1983 general elections in Turkey marked the beginning of a very 
significant era in the histoiy of the country, because the ANAP initiated a 
campaign to solve the ongoing political crisis and economic crisis. In fact, this 
crisis can be traced back to as early as the 1970s, and probably even to the 1960s, 
during which time the gap between the political left and the right widened. As 
Ahmet Evin (1994: 23) has argued, “the return of a civilian government in 1983 
did not constitute a significant step toward the “civilianisation” of politics; it was 
the beginning of a process that would gain momentum later in the decade”.
Ideology o f the ANAP
Turgut Özal, in his speech after he had formed the party, claimed that, “the symbol 
of the party is the map of Turkey, ornamented by honeycombs and honeybee. The
' For further information on the laws regulating the party formation and activities see, Özbudun, Ergun,
1995. ‘‘Siyasi Partiler ve Demokrasi,” (Political Parties and Democrac}') in S iy a s i P a r t i l e r  v e  D e m o k r a s i  
(Symposium), Tesav Yayınlan.
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bee represents hard-working, and the honeycombs represent the prosperity 
spreading out to any corner of the country. Our party is based on the values of 
nationalism, conservatism, social justice and free-market. Our party will be the 
voice of the moderate (ılımlı) right, and no extremist values can find a place in our 
party^ ” (Tuncer, 1987: 17).
When the founders of the ANAP are considered, it is observed that with the effect 
of the political ban on the pre-existing political parties and politicians, the majority 
of them are new comers to Turkish politics. They are mostly from the private 
sector. Nevertheless, there are representatives of both the moderate left and the 
extremist right and among the religiously oriented the moderates and hard-liners. 
In other words, there is not a unified main characteristic among founders.
The most prominent figure in the party; Turgut Özal is an illustrative example to 
this varying nature of the founders. Turgut Özal started his career from the top 
bureaucracy of the State Planning Organisation in 1969 and continued with the top 
bureaucracy of the Prime Ministry in 1979 for the Second Nationalist Front 
government. His first attempt to enter to politics was in 1977, when he ran for the 
general elections as İzmir candidate of the National Salvation Party. Yet, it 
remained only an attempt. He worked for the private sector and served as the 
president of the MESS (Employers Unions) which is well known with its clear 
position in rejecting any agreement with Labour Unions. As it is seen, his
■ Here and after, translations are done by the author
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background was quite diverse, both liberal -working in the private sector and 
presidency of the MESS, and close relations with Demirel governments- and 
conservative -candidature from the Nationalist Salvation Party.
The ANAP stated that its success in the 1983 general elections was based on its 
inclusive structure, which encompassed four different political orientations. This 
strategy was quite successful because the most important problem of the 1970s 
was political polarisation and unrest. The party tried to develop a new ideological 
system by harmonising all the contradictory elements of the traditional but 
previously polarised ideologies and strove for the formation of an “organic 
ideology” (Tiinay, 1993: 21). The very salutation of the party, bringing the hands 
above the head, was the symbol of this unifying characteristic of the party. This 
inclusive characteristic of the ANAP shows that Turgut Ozal and the top leaders of 
the party had driven the necessary pragmatic lessons from the 1970s political 
arena. Although it is stated that the political ideology of the ANAP is a four-partite 
ideology, conservatism and liberalism were the most important ingredients of that 
ideology, which is worth evaluating further.
Political Conservatism
Conservatism of the party can be studied in two steps, the nationalist ideas of the 
party and the Islamism of the party. These two components constituted the
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strongest legs of the party ideology, namely conservatism. Mustafa Taşar, who at 
the time was a MP of the ANAP from Gaziantep and a member of the 
Administrative Committee of Central Decision (Merkez Karar Yönetim Kurulu), 
defined the conservatism of the party, in an interview with me in 1998, as 
followings: “Our understanding of conservatism denotes fidelity to our national 
{milli) and moral {ahlaki) values, to our culture {kültür) and histoiy, and to our 
traditions {gelenekler). Our understanding of conservatism is the conservation of 
what is good and valuable; this does not mean that we are against progress and 
change. On the contrary, our sacred target is a more civilised, prosperous and 
strong Turkey, open to progress and advancement. Progress and betterment can 
only be achieved by conforming to the time-old values. It is the only way to 
construct a building without demolishing the existing one. The progress, we are 
proposing, therefore, will be an honourable one”.
Nationalist ideas of the party are stated in the party documents as follows: “The 
nationalism of the party is to defend the indivisible territorial integrity of the 
country, the republic and the democracy as they are defined in the Constitution. At 
the centre of the nationalism of the ANAP, lies Atatiirkist nationalism. We 
consider nationalism as a cement that is the only guarantee of the future of the 
Turkish nation, originating from the love and respect of its people, accomplished 
by the loving the country, fermented by culture, maturated by consciousness of 
history and symbolised by the national flag. The idea of nationalism that had been 
pursued by Atatürk, will be the most important engine and accelerator of progress
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as its body and spirit, and it will draw on the non-material borders of the 
development”(Report of the Ordinary Small Congress of the Motherland Party). In 
1998, As Abdulkadir Baş, at that time Deputy Chair of the ANAP, has claimed in 
an interview with me, “we are nationalist but it is not the nationalism of the 
Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP) that brings about unrest 
within society, and is against the modern world. Our understanding is based on 
being a citizen of Turkey, and seeing the interest of the country as superior over 
any particular interest and concern.”
A strong stress on Islamic values was one of the most important characteristics of 
the ANAP. Together with the nationalist sentiments, the party represented a 
compact at the same “modern version” of the ideology of conservatism. 
Abdulkadir Baş differentiates the notion of Islam in the ANAP and in the 
Nationalist Salvation Party, as follows: “we are conservatives but we are not 
behind the times, narrow-minded, and old-fashioned on the religious issue”
Social and political unrest in society would be calmed with such an inclusive and 
constructive ideology; “The increasing polarisation of Turkish political life in the 
1970s created opportunities for existing religious trends to be pushed even further” 
(Salt, 1995: 15). The ANAP saw religion as a necessary antidote to the polarisation 
of the 1970s. They used the religious theme to set a higher identity over other 
identities to form a compact whole in society. As Turgut Özal pointed out in an 
interview with Mustafa Çalık in 1992 “Our society represents a volunteer compact
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unity with the effect of Islam and this unity is the most important factor in 
constructing an identity as it was in the period of the Ottoman Empire. We could 
be able to construct a higher identity over different ethnic differences. It is religion 
that brings together the Muslims in Anatolia and Balkans. Islam has been a cement 
among different ethnic groups...being Turkish has been associated with being 
Muslim” (Ozal, 1992: 17). For that purpose, religious instruction at schools was 
made compulsory rather than elective. Article 24 of the Constitution of 1982 
stipulates that, education in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state 
supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall 
be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. No one shall be 
allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by 
religion in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal and political 
influence or for even partially basing the fundamental social, economic, political 
and legal order of the State on religious tenets.
Turgut Ozal, after the 1983 general election, repeatedly stressed the importance of 
religious values in the formation of Turkish nationalism. During the Ozal 
government, foreign relations with Islamic countries got warmer. Turkey began to 
play an important role in the affairs of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference 
(OIC). Turgut Ozal emphasised the importance of the Islamic world, and stated 
that “many countries now look upon Turkey as the leader of the Islamic world” 
(Turkish (Ankara) Daily News, 22 March 1984: 1). Many of the deputies of the 
ANAP have had close relations with the tarikats (religious brotherhood); Turgut
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Özal himself was proud of his close relations with the Nakşibendis (Yüzyıl, 1990: 
1). Before the 1983 general elections, Turgut Özal picked every ANAP candidate 
for parliament deliberately from different ideologies in order to bring people of 
different persuasions under the same roof He had also formed a deliberate alliance 
with organised religious groups that enabled the party to establish a virtual 
monopoly over the religious vote (Ayata, 1996: 44). As Heper (1991: 50-51) 
states, “the ANAP tried to develop a synthesis between Islamic values and 
pragmatic rationality, through reconciling the former cultural orientations with the 
requisites of economic growth and Western democracy. In the 1980s, Islam began 
to be rediscovered by the Turkish elites and became embedded in the policies 
which emphasised the market forces, the privatisation of state enterprises, and the 
de-centralisation of government”.
The ideology of “conservative nationalism” (Özal, 1987: 137) {muhafazakar 
milliyetçilik) can be defined as a variant of the nationalism of the 1970s. The 
ANAP constituted a synthesis between nationalism and Islamic values. As noted. 
Salt has called the ideology of the party as ‘nationalist-Islamic’ (Salt, 1995: 15). 
Since, conservative, and/or Islamic nationalism would discriminate only against 
the revolutionary left, it could articulate the interests of different groups into a 
compact whole. This idea was very important to solve the economic and political 
crisis left over from the 1970s. In order to bring together as many people as 
possible under the ideology of the party, Özal used the concept of ortadirek or 
literally, “the central pole of the nomad’s tent”, to denote small agricultural
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producers, workers, government employees, craftsman and artisans which were 
symbolically taken to constitute the centre of Turkish society. In time, this concept 
of ortadirek turned out to be just a strategy and rhetoric; while Özal was trying to 
include every segments of society under the party program, he was really 
interested with the interests of capitalist class in society.
In the ideology of the ANAP, individual- family-society relations are considered 
conservatively stemming form the Islamic values and rationality stemming from 
Ozal's engineering formation. Therefore, Islamist engineers were trying to 
combine the values of conservative domestic culture and the rationality of modern 
Western culture. (Göle, 1992: 53).
Family, according to the Party, was so important to deem it, “the base of our 
nation” and the traditions were regarded as “play[ing] a pre-eminent role in the 
preservation of our family structure”. Family is believed and expressed repeatedly 
as the guarantee for the coming generations respecting our moral and national 
values.
Economic Liberalism
The ANAP government accused the previous governments of being too closed in 
international relations and the economic sphere. Ozal pointed out that “In the
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previous years, Turkish politicians were pursuing closed policies both in 
international relations and economic terms. They were hesitating to be open to the 
international arena and trying to build a wall around Turkey. Closed society and 
closed economy in turn leads to an isolated Turkey. With the ANAP, we aim to 
change these closed policies and we succeed to an extent. Not only in the 
international sphere, but some economic changes were held, because, being open 
to the international environment politically necessitates a strong market economy. 
For this purpose we indulge in a series of both political and economic reforms” 
(Ozal: 1985: 20). This change from the state-led economy to free market economy 
started by the January 24, 1980 economic program and actually was followed by 
the military government of the coup. The ANAP government by further dedicating 
itself to that program cam ^o the political agenda with the motto of ‘freer market, 
smaller state’.
The January 24, 1980 economic program brought about a drastic shift towards the 
primacy of the individual and the market economy. It espoused the idea that the 
individual was much more important and privileged than the state. Liberalisation 
attempts during 1980-1986 were introduced as a part of a Stabilisation Program. 
After more than seven years of uninterrupted implementation of the program, the 
results were mixed: remarkable achievements paralleled by complete failures. The 
rate of growth of the Gross National Product (GNP) that averaged 5.1 per cent 
during 1981-1986 was considered as a positive sign for improvement when 
compared to the stagnation during 1978-1980 (World Currency Yearbook, 1987:
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837). However, it was not higher than the previous two decades. The growth of 
these years was replaced with the fluctuations in the second half of the decade and 
a sharp reduction by 1989. According to Fikret §enses (1988; 11-12), more 
significant was an extraordinary growth in exports, which increased (in billion 
dollars) from 2.9 in 1980 to 5.7 in 1982 and 7.5 in 1986. This was accompanied by 
a sharp shift in export composition toward manufactures and by market expansion 
to include Middle Eastern and North African countries. This shift in the export 
orientation showed itself in the GNP as well. The share of exports in GNP 
increased from 3.8 percent during 1977-79 to 13.6 percent during 1983-86. This 
increase in the export rates was an instrument in keeping the current account 
deficit at a modest level.
However, these ‘betterments’ did not bring about a sharp decline in inflation. It is 
true that the inflation rate decreased to 27 percent in 1982 from 107 percent in 
1980. Yet, it again became three digits by the end of the decade. It follows that the 
short-term successes of the stabilisation program were followed by acute problems 
by the end of the decade.
On the other hand, these were sufficient for considerable improvement in the 
country’s credit-worthiness in the international financial community. External 
credits from a variety of sources, most notably from the OECD, IMF, World Bank, 
certain OPEC countries, and the international banking community, provided much 
of the balance of payments support. In time, external debts became an irritating
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problem in the economy. In 1980, before the adoption of the stabilisation program, 
Turkey’s external debt was around $16 billion. Ten years later it was more than 
doubled -  to $42.8 billion or slightly over 50 percent of the GNP.
Boratav (1990; 199-200) argues that changing and redefining the policy parameters 
regulating and shaping income distribution against labour was a major goal of the 
structural adjustment program of the 1980s although this was not one of the openly 
stated objectives of the program. Evidently relations of distribution had shifted 
dramatically in favour of capital and against labour during the 1980s. This result is 
directly determined by the income policy model of the 1980s, which can be 
characterised as authoritarian, anti-labour and anti-union. The economic policies 
during the martial law following the 1980 coup, union activities and collective 
bargaining were severely restricted, strikes were banned, and DISK, the 
Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions, was closed. Moreover, for four 
years, wage levels were determined by the government-controlled High Board of 
Arbitration. The Board set wages systematically and consistently below annual 
inflation rates.
As a result, changes with the January 24, 1980 program go beyond mere 
quantitative movements in economic values. The regulations modified radically 
the relations of distribution and this was a qualitative transformation. There was a 
shift from the state-led economy towards the more market-oriented economy. 
However, this transformation did not occur within a short time period. The party
42
was supporting the controlled change and the military was just a step behind the 
ANAP government. That means both the political and economic policies of the 
party were under tight scrutiny. Perhaps with the affect of the conservative values 
of the party and/or with the effect of the political environment of the time, the 
proposed changes in the economic activities took place in accordance with a step 
by step strategy in order not to disturb both the opposing sections in society and 
the more conservative supporters and participants of the party.
Reliable empirical findings show that the 1980s witnessed the evolution of a 
distinct maturity within the bourgeoisie, whose class interests became dominant 
over other conflicting interests. It has been argued that, the overall anti-labour and 
pro-capital orientation of the economic policies of the period had been the unifying 
force behind the bourgeoisie and resulted in the mobilisation of massive moral, 
ideological and material support provided by all segments of the business 
community first to Junta, and later to the Motherland Party (Boratav, 1990: 225).
These negative results of the stabilisation program, indeed, were not the 
unexpected results of the project because this program never aimed at an 
egalitarian income distribution. “Both Ozal and the party program repeatedly 
declared that the economy should be understood in its technical content, meaning 
no economic policy could be conducted with welfarism, egalitarian income 
distribution political consideration and so forth” (Tünay, 1993: 22). Therefore the 
economy had its own laws. This was perhaps the first time that the economy had
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priority over politics. Economic policies were legitimised by claiming that these 
policies were going to promote the future interests of society. Ideologically, 
economic liberalism and political liberalism were separated from each other.
According to Ozal, economic liberalism was to bring political liberalism. “If there 
is controlled and strong etatist economy in any country, one can not speak of the 
full existence of freedom of expression and freedom of the press.. .The reason why 
we support a free market competition system is that it paves the way for freedoms 
in expression”(Ozal, 1992; 11). He explained political freedoms in economic 
terms. Ideas were like goods in the market. The supporters of the ideas were firms. 
Suppliers of that particular good anticipated demands from customers. If a 
particular good in the market could not find demand then, that firm was destined to 
go bankrupt. An idea could not be rejected a priori before it entered the market: “If 
you label an idea deserving freedom of expression and if you label another not fit 
for that freedom, this would not be compatible with economic liberalism.... 
Freedom of expression and free market mechanism should co-exist” (Ozal, 1992:
11). Free competition and the free market was advertised as the best environment 
for freedom of the press and expression of thoughts.
The ANAP was, on the one hand a new fact, and on the other hand a strange 
combination of previously clashing ideologies. It could have been the best way to 
accommodate the military and negotiate with it. The party was functional in 
legitimating military intervention; and at the same time it was seen as an
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opposition to the military by some sections of society. Ozal nurtured both sides: 
the military and those who opposed the military. The ANAP served as a kind of 
revolt against the rule of the military. On the other hand, the military although 
they had not give full consent before the elections, realised that the Motherland 
Party would implement their policies and aims: political restructuring based on 
the ideal of harmonious society, economic restructuring based on the ideal of 
market-oriented economy. As for the economic considerations, the Motherland 
Party was a strict follower of the January, 24 economic program and this is 
natural because that program had been prepared by Turgut Ozal. When the 
political targets are considered, both military and the ANAP regarded the 
revolutionary left-wing groups and labour unions as the major problems that had 
locked the system.
The ANAP clearly tried to constitute a new hegemonic project after the 1980 
military coup d’etat. In order to get ideological appeal, the Motherland Party 
incorporated into its national-popular agenda several new issues such as anti- 
statism, privatisation, the two-nation project, a liberal-competitive individualism 
and apparently contradictory Islamic capitalist free enterprise.
The State, the Society and the Economy
The role attributed to the state is worth focusing on because an important shift in 
this issue came into the agenda with the introduction of the 24 January, 1980
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economic stabilisation program and further guaranteed by the policies of the 
ANAP government. This issue can best be dealt with under two subtitles; the state 
in the economic realm and the state in the social realm. The change in the role 
granted to the state is because of economic and social problems of the 1970s. The 
deep economic crises of the 1970s necessitated the reformulation of the relation 
between the state and the economy in the 1980s, and the political polarisation and 
social unrest in society necessitated a different type of relation between the state 
and society.
In the economic realm, a remarkable shift of philosophy occurred concerning the 
role of the state in economic affairs. The structural program of the 24 January 
represented a fundamental break with the policies of the previous decades. The 
ANAP was against the direct intervention of the state in economy. Turgut Ozal 
and the top leaders of the party encouraged private entrepreneur-ship and 
attempted to leave the market to its own devices. “The main role of the state in 
economic progress is allocative. The state should encourage the private 
entrepreneur and co-ordinate the economic relations of individuals and 
institutions. The state is there to solve the problems which may arise between the 
economic entities, and more importantly to set up an economic environment for 
the better functioning of the market by issuing laws that are not frequently 
changed” (Ozal, 1983a: 50). The state in the economic realm supported by the 
ANAP is, therefore, a night-watchman state; not intervening but correcting and 
allocating.
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In the 1980s, the role of the state in the social realm was seen as that of the 
construction and preservation of peace and trust among different groups in the 
society. Formation of a peculiar idea of justice was another important task of the 
state. There arose a different understanding of justice, since the moral values were 
determining in the society and since the notion of public good had a privileged 
status over the private one. The notion of justice implied virtue. The state provided 
for the unity, security, and order of the nation, and preserves a healthy 
environment for social and economic activities. Co-ordination and allocation of 
justice, trust, aid, social service and activity were the main tasks of the state: “The 
aim is not the wealth of the nation as a result of wealth of the state, but the wealth 
of the state via the wealth of the nation” (Party Program:! 1). “[I]f the state engages 
in the facilities that a citizen could do, then the state cannot fulfil its own tasks. 
The state cannot be a shopkeeper. We have seen the examples of that in ... [the] 
past and we have witnessed the failure of those policies” (Ozal: 1986:?). The state 
should be rolled back and the individual should be rolled forward. The concrete 
structures are the individual and society; the state and nation are only abstract 
terms. At the centre of society, there lies the individual. “The coming century is 
that of the individual” (Ozal, 1992: 23).
“We have to make the state smaller. A smaller state does not mean that the state 
will not be able to act. On the contrary, the state should be small and strong...The 
proportion of the state expenses in the national economy should not exceed 30
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percent. The strong state does not mean the state having too many officials. The 
state is not a father or God. The state is not the solution of unemployment. A 
strong state has less but able and elite officials” (Ozal, 1992). This understanding 
is a differentiating feature of the Ozal government. The term elite officials refers 
the “princes” of Turgut Ozal; a small group of high level bureaucrats having extra 
administrative power.
In sum, the process of liberalisation of the economy and the “neutralising and 
reintegration, if not eliminating, the anti system tendencies on the right” (Ergüder, 
1991; 565) -and primarily on the left- called for a strong state. Existence of a 
strong state implies a state distinct from society. Political struggles in society 
diminish and people become only interested in the economic activities. The 
political one turns out to be a profession and that sphere is believed to be those 
who are talented to be a politicians. The political, economic and the social domains 
began to be thought as compartmentalised in and after the 1980s. The state was 
conceptualised as strong and limited and one that stands above the society. No 
more regime critiques were allowed and only some micro-level policy critiques 
were acceptable “for the high interest of the nation”.
After 1987
In 1987, the political ban over the politicians of the 1970s was removed in the 
referendum with a 51 percent “yes” vote. This percentage was encouraging for
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Turgut Ozal to go to an early election, with a new election system with which the 
ANAP got the 36 percent of the votes and 65 percent of the seats. Following the 
general elections, Turgut Ozal was elected as the President after Kenan Evren. The 
next leader of the ANAP and Prime Minister was Yildirim Akbulut for two years. 
In 1990 congress, Mesut Yilmaz became the party leader after Yildirim Akbulut.
At the end of 1987, the available indicators of Turkey’s most extensively and 
radically planned and implemented orthodox structural adjustment program 
pointed out two major areas of concern for the policy-makers. First, there seemed 
to be an emerging socio-political consensus that the distributional aspects of the 
adjustment program required a more sensitive policy treatment in the future, which 
was likely to decrease the scope of reactions resulting in the future erosion of real 
incomes of unprotected groups in society. Second, the economic recovery and 
adjustment process needed to be transformed into a sustainable growth process to 
meet the pressing employment requirements of Turkey’s rapidly expanding labour 
force (Celasun, 1990: 379).
Apart from the failure in decreasing the inflation rate, the program had poor 
concern for unemployment and income distribution. Unemployment had risen 
from 14.0 percent in 1979 to 16.8 percent in the period of 1982-86. This rise in 
unemployment could be explained with reference to the objective of increasing the 
efficiency of State Economic Enterprises (SEEs), which had been generally tried to 
be achieved by combating with the so-called overstaffing. In spite of the
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insufficiency in available data, it is evident that the income distribution became 
worse in the following year of the 1980 program. Consequently, together with the 
rise in unemployment, fall in real wages and salaries affected social life 
unfavourably.
With the 1987 general elections the ANAP made a change in its strategy. It may be 
more correct to say that it was forced to shift its ideology. The end of the 1980s 
was markedly different from the beginning in terms of both national and 
international prospects for Turkey.
When Özal became president in 1989, the hidden struggle between the liberals and 
conservatives in the party sharpened. There began a new phase in the ideology of 
the party with overemphasis on free economy and under-emphasis on the 
conservative values of religion and tradition. Although Özal supported his wife’s 
candidature for the ANAP leadership in Istanbul province, the conservatives were 
defeated both in Istanbul and more importantly in the national congress of the 
party in which the leader of the liberal wing in the party, Mesut Yılmaz, was 
elected as party chairman.
This change in party politics has been discussed in relation to the individual 
characteristics of Mesut Yılmaz and Turgut Özal. However, in analysing the 
ANAP, this paper suggests analysing the ANAP should trace the party politics as a 
whole but not a compact one. There might be -and actually is- shifts in the
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ideology of the party, Ozal obviously affected the party ideology as the founder of 
the party, but this does not mean that after Ozal a radical change had occurred 
because of personal characteristics of Mesut Yılmaz. Yılmaz tried to hold the party 
together for this aim he in his speeches, pointed out both the importance of 
religion and conservatism and the liberalisation of the economy. “Liberalism 
without balanced conservatism leads to anarchy, conservatism without balanced 
with nationalism leads to a sheria state {dm devleti)" (Yılmaz, 1991).
The change in the ideology came about, because of the ambiguous characteristics 
of the party ideology from its beginning. The party elite had been divided into two 
separate segments; the liberal wing and the conservative wing each informed by an 
explicit ideology. Concerning certain issues, the tension between these two strands 
could be expected concerning some issues. This tension with the catalysing effect 
of the political opposition became increasingly more pronounced in the second half 
of the 1980s. Ziya Öniş (1992: 13) analyses the situation as “the tension between 
the two groups ... manifested itself in the context of the economic strategy. The 
“liberal view” in close association with the “new bureaucratic elites” wished to 
proceed with the program of economic liberalisation while at the same time 
maintaining monetary and fiscal discipline. The “conservative wing,” in contrast, 
favoured using the discretionary powers of the states as an instrument for 
broadening the electoral base of the party itself These sets of pressures help to 
illuminate why the government has increasingly relaxed fiscal discipline and 
followed an expansionary strategy in the post-1982 phase”. According to Öniş, all
51
this had nothing to do with the change of the leader; significant here were the 
internal characteristics of the ANAP itself Since the party has two poles one being 
conservative and the other being liberal, witnessing some shifts of the place where 
the party ideology stands should be expected. One time one group may be more 
dominant in the formation of the party ideology and another time the other group
may be decisive in the party ideology, 
In sum, the shift to an export promotion development strategy with the January 24 
economic program, the reconstitution of law and order with the 1981 Constitution, 
the progressively worsening income distribution with the ban on the activities of 
the labour unions, and the emergence of market-based individualism were among 
the most striking developments that paved the way for a new political and socio­
economic restructuring and equilibrium in the 1980s. These problems and changes 
affected the social, economic and political spheres of the 1990s. On the one hand 
the IMF-directed policies secured Turkey’s further integration into the world 
economic system, while on the other hand, a new political alliance has formed 
showing similarities in its ideological stance and specific strategies those of 
Reaganism and Thatcherism. This issue will be the basic concern of the following 
chapters.
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Chapter Three
THE ANAP WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL RELATIVES
Turgut Ozal himself has compared his politics with what he thinks was happening 
in Britain and the United States:
“In the 1970s, leftist movements were dominant in politics, especially 
leftist philosophy was hegemonic. Sometimes, leftist parties were losing 
the political power in the elections, but dominance of the leftist ideologies 
in philosophy was remaining as it is. However, with the 1980s, some 
evident changes have occurred. The direction of these changes was towards 
the individual, free enterprise, and the market economy. When Thatcher in 
Britain came to power, it was the first important political shift. Then 
Reagan in the United States and Christian Democrats in Germany came to 
power, and an important, world-wide effective movement has begun” 
(Ozal, 1992: 8).
The 1980s in Britain and the United States was accepted widely in the literature as 
the incarnations of the New Right ideology. There might be some differences 
between the practices of the Thatcher government and Reagan government. This 
does not, however, refute the idea that the ideas and doctrines of the New Right 
have strongly affected, since both the New Right ideology and the Thatcher and 
Reagan governments seek to overcome the economic, political hence hegemonic
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crises of the late 1970s, Therefore, in this chapter, I shall do a comparative analysis 
between Britain, the United States and the Turkey in the 1980s. By referring the 
former two under the title some specific issues, the main objective is to explore the 
general and specific characteristics of the 1980s under the rule of the ANAP
government.
Political Objectives
As a political project, the ANAP had two overriding objectives: to introduce 
market liberalism and to create the conditions for free market economy by 
limiting the scope of the state in the economic realm; to restore a harmonious 
social environment by restoring the authority of the government. The first 
objective was deliberately promising to set out an alternative political regime that 
had not been established. The second objective was a solution to the specific 
political condition of the 1970s but behind that, there was the idea of restructuring 
the society via regulating it by the authority of the government.
The crisis of British regime fused with the crisis of the world economy and crisis 
of social democratic governments created a deep crisis of hegemony in Britain. It 
was in this atmosphere that the project of Thatcher gained acceptance. The 
impulse behind Thatcherism was the need to restore the government’s authority 
and reverse the decline of the economy (Gamble, 1988:37). Thatcher government
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defined the problems of the 1970s as the overloaded state which was considered 
as the cause of economic problems and weak government bringing about the 
political problems.
In the United State of the late 1970s, state policies were criticised of undermining 
promise of interest group pluralism, since the state serves for the reallocation of 
the resources via welfare services and expenses. Therefore, there arose a kind of 
legitimation loss accompanied by the declining economic performance and fiscal 
crises. This situation forced the political right to develop an alternative 
legitimating political-economic ideology of “market liberalism” (Smith, 
1988:167). Reaganite policies in the economic, political and the social realms 
sought to establish an alternative hegemonic project opposing the liberal legacies 
of the 1960s: expanded welfare, the politicisation of the race and gender issues 
around the civil rights and women’s movements, and the gains of organised 
labour (Helvacioglu, 1991, 149). They believed that “ ...environmentalism, arms 
control, gun control, abortion rights, gay rights, feminism, welfare, affirmative 
action, pornography and the Equal Rights Amendment all fostered a destructive 
“permissiveness” that undermined the value of family, church, and work” 
(Schaller, 1992:23).
Thatcher in Britain and Reagan in the United States had the objective of 
reforming politics and economy. Both leaders blamed the Welfare State expenses 
as the main cause of the economic crises. Moreover as the state got bigger in the
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1970s, it lost its ability to control the society. Therefore, another significant 
objective of both leaders was to construct the authority of the government framing 
the society.
The problems and the political objectives of the Reagan government in the United 
States and Thatcher government in Britain depict a resemblance with those of the 
Turkish case. The division between the capital and the labour became clearer and 
it has begun to be questioned. The restlessness in the society, in the end, paved the 
way to a legitimation crisis. All criticisms of the 1970s concluded that the United 
States’ and Britain’s political systems were in crisis. The lack of legitimacy was 
to be solved by an authoritarian strong government and the economic problems 
were to be combated by introducing a smaller state in the economy, that is, by 
cutting both the welfare expenses and tax rates.
As Gamble has argued, the problems in the 1970s occurred at the world-wide 
level, and all governments in the mid-1970s and early 1980s were forced to adopt 
similar crises packages to deal with similar problems (Gamble, 1988: 14-15). 
Proving Gamble’s idea, when one considers the political objectives of the Ozal 
government with those of the Reagan and Thatcher governments, it is possible to 
identify unavoidable resemblances. This is because, the economic crisis of the 
1970s was a global crisis of the capitalist system. Everywhere, the problem was 
almost the same, and the proposed solutions for the problems were similar. 
Although the propositions for solution depict some resemblance, the way they
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were conducted might differ because of specific, but not unique, characteristics of 
the politics and economics in these countries.
Leadership
Personality of the leader interestingly became important for the politics of the 
1980s. The electoral triumph of the Motherland party in 1983 was so marked that it 
focused the attention on the personality of Turgut Ozal. Furthermore, the term 
Ozalism has begun to be used by academics, journalists and politicians. Ozal was 
one of the very few Turkish political leaders whose name has been used to denote 
a particular ideology, political style, leadership and political program. Moreover 
following period is considered to be affected by the ideology of that period.
This personification is not valid only for Turkey. Other political leaders who 
identify him/herself with the ideas of the New Right had the same image. 
Thatcherism in Britain and Reaganism in the United States were two of the most 
prominent examples.
“The widespread use of the term ‘Thatcherism’ ...came to stand for the distinctive 
ideology, political style, and programme of policies of the British Conservative 
Party after Margaret Thatcher was elected leader in the 1975" (Gamble, 1998; 1).
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Thatcher as the leader of her party became a dominant figure of the 1980s with her 
individuality.
Ronald Reagan has been considered as a strong leader in the literature, but this is 
not to say that, the Thatcher profile and the Reagan profile will be more of the 
same. In the case of Thatcher we had to penetrate an emphasis on difference, 
dominance, self-assertion and realism. In Reagan’s case the basic notions should 
be unities, sentiment, dreams, myths but the hidden side of Reagan is self- 
assertion, ambition and anger. Reaganism had been, first and foremost, an attack 
on ‘weak’ leadership (Little, 1988; 120-121). In this sense, Ozal’s characteristics as 
a leader seem closer to those of Reagan, however, Thatcher’s emphasis on 
difference was not alien to Ozal. His party structure was based on hierarchy and 
highly dominated by the leader.
Although, these names have been used to understand the events in the 1980s, these 
policies are not be reducible to the personal projects of a single individual because 
they were not created by one person and what happened in the 1980s was not only 
a change in the style of leadership but also in policies and programs. Obviously, 
Ozal, Thatcher, and Reagan had personal contributions and these were important. 
Nevertheless, an analysis of those policies which only concentrates on the 
individual characteristics of these leaders would seriously be inadequate. It is true 
that these leaders intentionally identified the policies with their personalities, and 
they used their position as leaders to promote the spread of those ideas. However,
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the changes of the decade concerned were the results of the intellectual climate 
rather than individuals. Thus, the shape, style and the pace of the changes have 
been strongly influenced by the leaders but not the direction of those changes 
(Ashford, 1987: 25).
Strong leadership is the supplementary notion of the New Right. The political 
message was: install a strong leader and expect to work or get out of the way. The 
conservative position rests on the belief that in any society [and surely in any 
party] there are recognisable superior persons whose inherited standards and 
values and position ought to be protected and who should have a greater influence 
on public affairs than others (Hayek, 1960: 402).
Labour, Capital and Need for Inequality
In Turkey, Ozal government was informed both by the ‘chaotic’ situation of the 
late 1970s and supported by the military. There was already widely accepted 1982 
Constitution makers of which “did not envisage a model of pluralistic politics in 
which trade unions, voluntary associations, and public professional organisations 
played an open and active role in politics (Ozbudun, 1991: 42). The Constitution 
was binding moreover supporting the post-1980 policies. Nevertheless, even if the 
Constitution had not been such, end result of economic liberalism of the ANAP 
government would have been considerable interference with the rights and
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freedoms of unions. They attempted to rationalise the economic system 
essentially along the lines of TÜSÎAD (The Industrialists and Businessmen 
Association of Turkey). The government provided direct support to the exporters 
through tax exemptions and low-cost credits. Big industrialist that could find 
markets abroad would have benefited from those policies (Arat, 1991, 142).
As noted, the January 24, 1980 economic decisions, represented a shift from 
Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) to Export Oriented Industrialisation 
(EOI). Therefore, after 1980, exports were considered to be a very significant 
activity for Turkey in being more productive. Although the state was considered to 
be detrimental to the market when it interfered, export incentives were widely 
practised especially after the 1984. A number of the export incentive mechanisms 
have been invented: credits from the Central Bank, credits from the Turkey Export 
Credit Bank/ Tiirk Eximbank, tax incentives (low rates or exemptions for export 
goods), in-cash support from off-budget resources. Among these credit practises, 
off-budget resources were set up in the second half of the 1980s. The idea behind 
the export incentives was that given money would return back to the budget in the 
future. However, this aim could not be succeeded because, for instance available 
data show that the rate of increase in the total incentive expenditures is three times 
larger than the rate of increase in the total export between the years 1980 and 1987. 
Moreover the gap between exports and import widened between the years 1978/9 
and 1985 as shown in the tables below.
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Table 1. Export Incentives (1980-1987) Million TL.
Years Total Total Export 
Incentives
1980 4.905 221.498
1981 24.653 530.716
1982 86.816 937.310
1983 148.990 1298.945
1984 329.060 2608.331
1985 332.768 4152.927
1986 736.271 5012.346
1987 662.195 8884.331
Source: Aktan, 1992; 100
Table 2. Export and Import Amounts
Export 
(million $) 
Import 
(million $) 
Deficit 
(million $)
1978/79 average 1985
2275 7959
4834 11613 
2559 3654
Source: Boratav, 1988; 128,
In Turkey the allocation of the resources in the 1980s changed drastically. 
Especially, share of the salaries in the GNP has declined. Between 1980 and 1988, 
prices of the indispensable consumption goods have risen between 12 to 55 times, 
while, the reel wage index in 1988 decreased to 43.7, if it is accepted as 100 in 
1979. (Berksoy, 1989: 2; Boratav, 1988: 133; Güçlü and Bilen, 1995: 165-166). 
This meant a drastic decline in the purchasing power of the wage earner.
On the one hand, the share of the labour was continuously diminishing, on the 
other hand, the share of the capitalist class denoted by the interests rates, rents in
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the Gross National product has been increased. In the 1980s the economic polices 
were based on low wage.
In Thatcherism, hierarchy was the basic characteristics of the system. Ranking was 
according to productiveness and usefulness but not according to need. There are 
workers and unemployed, there are savers who sacrifice their own good for the 
good of the whole and spenders who pursue only her own interest. The Nation was
'I
divided into two; productive/parasite , North/South. For this reason the project of 
Thatcher was labelled as “Two-nation project” (Jessop et. all. 1987: 55-58). 
Margaret Thatcher had been an opponent of extra-parliamentary movements and 
obviously the target number one is the union movements. Direct actions to the 
decision taking mechanisms were seen as ‘guerrilla action’ (Little; 1988: 95), 
anarchic and intolerable. As noted, the labour part of the balance was blamed to be 
guilty, especially the organised labour, but on the other hand, capital part of the 
balance was seen to be the only solution. The result was the state supporting the 
capital and excluding the labour. Thatcher stated the importance of inequality for 
the well being of the nation.
The off-budget funds were encountered in Britain too. The acronym “QUANGO” 
(Quasi Autonomous National Government Organisations) has been used to denote 
off-budget funds. Philip Holland, who was a member of the parliament working 
on QUANGOS criticised this practice. Holland (1979:3) claimed that nobody
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exactly knew the number of QUANGOS, the number of workers employed in 
these, and more importantly, how much these QUANGOS spent.
Concerning the case in the United State, James Bennett and Thomas Di Lorenzo 
(1983: 6) claimed that the formation of the off-budget public sector in that 
country led to abuse of the state resources for political benefit and gain. In the 
United States, the statistical data for off-budget funds cannot be reached or they 
are intentionally hidden.
Although, the main frame of the policies matches in three of the governments,
when the speeches of the leaders are concerned, there are some differences in the
stress on the need for inequality. In these three governments the Thatcher
government was more open in its speeches, but Reagan as well openly -but not as
clear as Thatcher- cited the importance of the capital owners for the United States.
One of his main attacks in the election campaigns was high tax rate, because high
tax rates would be a burden on the productive segments. However, the taxation
system should be accepted as one of the significant mechanisms of the
redistribution of wealth. President Carter was arguing that the taxes should be high
in order to combat with the high inflation. But Reagan argues in TV that;
“High tax rates don’t lower prices. They raise them. In the 1970s, taxes 
grew faster than any other item in the household budget- including the 
price of energy. High tax rates discourage work and production. They 
added to the cost of living. If we make a deep cut in everyone’s tax rate.
 ^here tJie term ‘parasite’ does not only refer poor segments of society, but it also denotes the unprofitable 
economic activities of public and private sector.
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we’ll have lower prices, an increase in production, and a lot more peace of 
mind” (cited in Evans and Novak, 1981: 61)
Behind his speech, there lies the idea of taking the burden from the back of the 
rich. How can one drive at this conclusion? This is because, which part of the 
society can be productive if the taxes would be lower, the immediate answer is the 
owner of the capital, because, those who live on wages, can not be productive in 
the sense of the investment. Reagan, therefore, had the ideas similar to Thatcher’s 
but he did not have enough courage to utter the main idea behind his speeches. 
Ozal’s objectives were, in this case, are much more hidden. He is far from openly 
stating his main aim. On the contrary, he seemed to be on the side of the labour, by 
his well-known term orta-direk. He repeatedly claimed that he included each and 
every section of the society. But he was quite critical about the ‘concessions’ given 
to the organised labour. In his memoirs, this can be seen clearly, after he had 
become president, the main disputes with both Mesut Yılmaz and Yıldırım 
Akbulut, were on the rises in the wages and agreements with the labour unions. 
Özal pointed out that. The biggest mistake of Yildirim AJkbulut was the acceptance 
of the increase in the salaries of the Zonguldak mine-workers. After Yıldırım 
Akbulut, Mesut Yılmaz did the same thing. He signed a harsh agreement with the 
workers. This was very dangerous and false. He had a mistake because he did not 
ask me beforehand (cited in Tokatlı, 1999: 223). After Mesut Yılmaz had been 
elected as the party leader, many people think that the relation between Yılmaz and 
Özal would be closer, but the result was the opposite. Especially, about the
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contracts between the labour unions agreed by Yılmaz annoyed Özal very much 
(Tokath, 1999: 223).
In three of the concerned countries, governments of the 1980s blamed the 
‘concessions’ given the labour union and/or welfare expenses for the poor in the 
1970s as one of the main causes of the economic crises. Therefore, these 
governments tried to exclude those parts from their agenda. State was not to back 
the poor; on the contrary, in order to make the rich more productive, the state was 
to provide incentives for the rich.
This policy can be seen in Turkey, in Britain, and in the United States. The basic 
assumption in this policy is that, the inequality should not be avoided. Moreover, 
it should be accepted, for a nation to be successful, the state should accept the 
existence of inequality, and adjust the pace to the fastest one not the slowest one. 
If the slowest one cannot reach the rest then the state cannot do anything about 
that. The aim was to make the government leaner and stronger, better able to help 
the fastest for being freer in its economic activities and more productive and 
strong against populist aspirations. The market was to be freed up to produce 
wealth for one and all.
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Bureaucratie Change and Local Governments
Another important shift of the Turkish political structure with the government of 
the ANAP was the change in the bureaucratic formation. The ANAP decided to 
bring about a combination of political and administrative decentralisation. Its view 
was that devolving powers to the localities would both promote democracy and 
make delivery of more and better services possible. From 1984 onward, in a 
number of urban centres, two-tiered metropolitan municipalities were established. 
These municipalities were provided with significant powers and relatively ample 
financial resources.
This change in the municipal structure in Turkey is very significant. The ANAP 
government preferred to promote construction and housing sectors to revitalise the 
Turkish economy via activating the municipalities during the 1980s.
Having blamed the previous governments for letting and supporting a state that 
spread itself too thin, Ozal aimed to set up a new small, young, and able tightly- 
knit governing stratum that decides and acts for itself and excludes the 
participation of the others. The ANAP government aimed to penetrate into the 
bureaucracy. So-called ‘princes’ of Ozal replaced the top level traditional 
bureaucrats. By doing so, the range of decision making sphere of central 
government would remain narrow. Much was left as the responsibility of local
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government and these structures were not directly controlled form the centre; 
instead the central government came to rely on various informal mechanisms for 
ensuring the collaboration of local authorities with the program of the centre. To 
put it differently, the state actors, both bureaucratic and political elites became 
relatively autonomous in choosing and imposing the measures that they see as 
immediate and for the benefit of the society.
Half of this strategy was witnessed in the Conservative Party government in 
Britain, “the formula developed by the Conservatives was to maintain the authority 
of the state by protecting the autonomy of the circles of top decision-makers from 
the pressures of democracy. This was attempted not only for those parts of the state 
outside the government, such as the judiciary and the armed forces, but also for the 
cabinet and the higher civil servants” (Gamble, 1998: 169). In the central 
government, decision making actors became lesser in quantity and the decision 
making process was left to the high-bureaucrats, but in Britain this has not meant 
the increased importance of the local government as it was the case in Turkey; in 
Britain decisions were taken in the central government by a small group of able 
bureaucrats.
In the United States, Ronald Reagan fully appreciated the value of decentralised 
government. He thought that federalism would be the only way to solve most of 
the problems of the 1970s because according to him, federalism fosters social 
harmony since it reduces government to a manageable scale and makes citizen
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participation more readily accessible; federalism promotes civic responsibility by 
fostering citizen participation; federalism provides diversity and allows for local 
considerations in problem solving; and more importantly, federalism fosters 
accountability because responsibilities are sorted out, with a national government 
focusing on national problems, and local governments handling their own local 
problems, the system does not become overloaded and congested (Willliamson, 
1990:1). Reagan’s own experience as the governor of California had greatly 
strengthen his beliefs in the urgent need to decentralise power. Decentralisation 
was an issue often raised in the 1980 campaign. He said “I don’t believe in big, 
centralised federal government. I believe that the federal government has 
attempted to do far too many things. ...that there are federal programs that should 
be returned to the states, along with the tax resources to pay for them. I believe that 
the federal government is too interventionist (Reagan, 1980, cited in Drew, 1981: 
110).
In the United States, decentralisation of power was pursued more determined than 
both in Turkey and in England. In this issue the United States depict a specific 
character away from the essence of the New Right ideology, because what should 
be decentralised was not power but only activities. Behind this strategy there lies 
the same idea used against the Keynesian welfare state that the more loaded the 
decision making organ gets, the weaker it becomes.
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Minimal state and the strong government was the motto of this change in the 
bureaucratic structure. It idea that the smaller the decision making organs gets, the 
stronger and the more effective it becomes. It becomes stronger because in time, 
political elite and the bureaucratic elite were identified with reference to the other 
one. In Turkey, the prime minister surrounded by a limited number of ministers of 
state, special advisors, and high-level bureaucrats became the real locus of decision 
making (Heper, 1989). The power which modern democracy possesses would be 
even more intolerable in the hands of some small elite.
State and the Economy
Limited state was seen to be the only way to overcome the ongoing economic 
crises of the late 1970s. Both the World Bank and IMF supported the attempts to 
limit the scope of the state activities in the developing countries. In another 
words, the notion of smaller state was almost invented globally against the 
economic problems.
Reagan, Thatcher and Ozal too openly and repeatedly stated that the state should 
be smaller for the well-being of the people since it paved the way for the free 
activity of the market. The states however, did not become smaller. On the 
contrary, they have become bigger and bigger.
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In Turkey, in 1980 according to the documents of the State Planning Organisation 
the ratio of the public expenditure to GNP was 33.1 percent. This ratio has 
become larger during the 1980s and it reached to 39.2 percent in 1992. The 
ANAP having more devoted program to the limited state then any of the pre­
existing parties has made the state bigger. Between 1980-1990, size of the state 
(increase in the state budget) has got larger 23.0 percent on average. The same 
ratio became 24 percent on average between 1980-1992. These numbers show 
that Özal could not limit the state on the contrary, it has got bigger (Aktan, 1994: 
22) .
Welfare Expenditures / GNP is an important indicator to explore the size of the 
state. While in 1970, in Britain, this ratio was 4 percent, in 1975 it reached to 29 
percent. Following Britain the United States has the same path: 8.2 percent in 
1950, 18.7 percent in 1980. Vural Fuat Savaş (1994: 13) claims that the ratio of 
Welfare Expenses to GNP in Britain and in the United States continued to be 
high, although these were efforts render it smaller during the 1990s. Gray 
maintains that
Government in Britain and the United States has never, even at its 
smallest, been minimum state of classical liberal doctrine. ... a century and 
more of interventionism has built up needs and expectations which must 
be addressed, and it is a mistake to suppose that every move from status 
quo in the direction of earlier forms of limited government represent an 
unequivocal improvement. Again developments wholly external to the 
growth of government -  exogenous changes such as technological 
innovation and the emergence of a truly global market -  render the project
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of returning to the limited state of early nineteenth century Britain an 
exercise in anachronism” (Gray, 1993: 6).
Hence, although liberal understanding of the New Right envisages the limited 
state and the strong government for the creation and continuation of the ‘Great 
Society’, these policies cannot be sustainable. There are two reasons for that: the 
first reason is the strong effect of the conservative view on economy that is, the 
conservative feels safe and content only if he assured that some higher wisdom 
watches and supervises change, only if he knows that some authority is charged 
with keeping the change “orderly” (Hayek, 1960: 400). This is closely related to 
two characteristics of conservatism: its fondness for authority and its lack of 
understanding of economic forces. The second reason was/is that, the market in 
the capitalist system has its inherent contradictions to which the state is there to 
redirect. Therefore, the market is destined to be intervened in the capitalist system 
and the state cannot stand as a separate and static entity merely monitoring the 
system from outside. On the contrary, whatever its main goal is, the state should 
intervene in the market for the reproduction of the capitalist relations. It can be 
stated that it is fairly difficult to restrict the power and ability of the state to 
intervene in the market and society. Even the reverse is true and this is both 
unavoidable and necessary for the system’s survival.
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Chapter Four
CONCLUSION
The year 1980 represents a remarkable shift in Turkish politics. In that year, a 
significant twist has occurred in Turkey concerning the role of the state both in 
economic and social affairs. Generally, when the year 1980 is considered as a 
turning point, scholars pay relatively less attention to the January 24, 1980. In this 
study, I have focused on this economic program more than the military 
intervention. With the introduction of the January 24, 1980 economic decisions, 
economic structure shifted towards the export-oriented industrialisation from 
import substitution industrialisation. This economic change was accompanied by 
the important change in the political understanding.
In the 1970s and 1960s political left and the political right were in continuous 
conflict. Organised labour was quite active with its determined strikes during the 
1970s. Right-wing extremist, as well, was active in their demonstrations against
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the leftist extremists. The political environment of the 1970s can best be described 
by the phrases of ‘polarisation of polity’ and ‘politicisation of society’. In this 
essay, I have examined the Turkish politics of the 1980s with respect to the 
ideology of the New Right.
The N ew  Right
The New Right has two traditionally conflicting strands; liberalism and 
conservatism. Liberalism and conservatism in the New Right have been 
incorporated into each other but have not constituted a compact ideology. 
Therefore, instead of “neo-liberalism” or “neo-conservatism”, I prefer to use the 
phrase New Right, because, “neo-liberalism” and “neo-conservatism” differ only 
rhetorically but the essence under the rhetoric is the same. Liberalism and 
conservatism in their traditional forms contradict each other oh several issues. 
However, the New Right is not a mere addition of liberalism to conservatism but a 
sort of evolution from their traditional frames. Conservatism and liberalism in the 
New Right are very different from that to which these names have been 
traditionally attached. On the one hand, primacy of the market and necessity of 
limited state were conserved. On the other hand, importance of traditions, religion, 
family and national identity, and, for the construction and preservation of these 
institutions, the idea of strong government became a part of the New Right 
ideology.
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The New Right has made peace between age-old rival ideologies. This new 
coalition was not an accident; it was wisely formed, on the one hand, rolling back 
the state in the economy would cause some disruption in social life, and, on the 
other hand, resort to conservatism would lessen the negative social influences of 
the change. Conservatism is thus, the sine qua non of this alignment and it renders 
the ideology viable. Rather than defending the status quo like the old right, those 
subscribing to the New Right are for a change in the economic power structure. 
Arguing that true conservatives could not be complacent and simply hold the line 
against further change, Paul Weyrich (cited in Short, 1989:130) has noted, “We 
have to take a turn in the other direction. The New Right does not want to 
conserve, we want to change, we are the forces of change” but not that of drastic 
change. Conservatism in the New Right has never been a backward-looking 
doctrine. The tension between conservatives and liberals is not the direction of the 
change but the pace of it (Hayek, 1960; 398).
The state, within the frameworks of the New Right understanding, should be 
limited in the sense that the state should not provide the services which individuals 
can conduct. Following is one of the most often made claims of the proponents of 
the New Right: “[t]he growth of the size of the state in the post-war period has 
come about through inadequate constitutional mechanisms that have allowed the 
state to become burdened with tasks which would not be permitted by orthodox 
liberal public-good theory” (Barry, 1987: 67).
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In order to overcome the economic crises of the late 1970s the New Right 
proposed that the state should be rolled back from the economic affairs, because if 
the state intervenes the economy then the spontaneity of the market would be 
adversly affected. However, the ideology of the New Right do not support the 
strong laissez-faire economy, “[tjhere should be intervention to preserve the rules 
and procedures of the competitive system itself, not to interfere with the working 
of that system. Government control should not be used to steer the economy in 
any particular direction, except to prevent spontaneous development from 
proceeding in a way which would be destructive of the price mechanism” (Barry, 
1987: 181). The state should be there to correct the market failures in case of need 
but it should not be an actor in the economy as it had been supported by 
Keynesian economics. The state can only be symbolised as a guardian or night- 
watch-man in the New Right ideology.
The New Right defines the political terms such as freedom, equality, participation 
and democracy, with the terminology of economics. If one talks about with the 
same terminology, following points may be made. The New Right has been a 
successful new commodity, supplied to the right market by well-advertised 
suppliers. Suppliers of this new commodity brought together the previously 
existing two unplanted inventory; liberalism and conservatism. These two 
commodities have faced with the problem of excess supply.
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In the 1980s, there was no substitute for this new commodity. And the market 
share of this commodity has become very large in the market with the help of 
well-organised advertisements and package. Indeed, with adding two previously 
existing but mutually exclusive commodities, the new product gained a new 
ingredient. This new product was not mere addition of the previous products. The 
supplier of this new product indeed, had been the monopoly company of the 
1970s. The old product had lost its market share because of some underestimated 
by-products of the consumption of it. Therefore, the monopoly company of the 
1970s, went under a process of product differentiation with the same 
infrastructure.
OZALISM
Turgut Ozal was appointed Deputy Prime Minister by the military regime. This 
position was not a surprise, because he was the architect of January 24, economic 
program as a higher civil servant during the Justice Party government. Moreover, 
he was in close contact with the international organisations, like the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Under the guidance of Turgut Ozal, new 
economic policies were put into effect. The restructuring of political sphere was 
accompanied by the attempts at economic liberalisation.
Beginning with the January 24 economic program, the 1980s, witnessed an attempt 
to separate the political and economic realms. Political struggle was the business of 
the political parties in the parliament and the economic struggle was the business
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of the labour and employer unions in the market. As in the New Right ideology, 
what was economic was not to be political and vice versa.
After three years of military rule, in November 1983, general elections were held 
and the victor of the election was the ANAP under the leadership of Turgut Ozal. 
The ideology of the ANAP was based on four different political strands; 
nationalism, conservatism, social justice, and market economy, which made it easy 
for the ANAP to claim that the party was the representative of the whole society 
rather than a segment of it.
Ozalism represents a sort of ‘Middle Way’ in the political strata. The party has 
been guided by the belief that the truth must lie somewhere between the extremes. 
Both liberals and conservatives agree on this ‘Middle Way’ understanding. 
Nationalism of the Party, for instance, was very different from patriotism, rather it 
is a deep attachment to national traditions. “It is this nationalistic bias which 
frequently provides the bridge from conservatism to collectivism; to think in 
terms of “our” industry or resource is only a short step away from demanding that 
these national assets be directed in the national interest” (Hayek, 1960: 405).
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Ozalism Compared with Thatcherism and Reaganism
Thatcherism and Reaganism are considered as two significant examples of the 
New Right ideology. To what extent Ozalism resembled Thatcherism and 
Reaganism in the 1980s, a kind of comparative analyses is necessary.
The most important difference between the Turkish and the other two practices is 
regarding the emergence of the New Right in the three countries. In Turkey of the 
1980s the military played an important role. The military placed a political ban on 
the political parties and politicians of the 1970s. None of the existing parties of 
the 1970s were allowed to run for the 1983 elections. In the 1983 elections, other 
tha the ANAP, there were two other parties competed. They had the blessings of 
the military. Under the circumstances, the victory of the ANAP was not a 
surprise. Pie was representing both a reaction to the military from the side of the 
society, but for the military he was devoted to the targets of the military: the faith 
in January 24 program, in the depolarisation of politics and depoliticisation of 
society. Both in Britain and the United States, governments came to power via 
elections without any restrictions to any party. Concerning this matter, there was a 
significant difference between the Turkish case on the one hand, and the British 
and American cases.
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The New Right ideology has not emerged out of nothing. The 1970s witnessed a 
crisis of the capitalist system. Social inequalities became so evident that criticisms 
were not merely directed towards political parties but also towards the political 
system itself It was a hegemony crisis of the welfare state in Britain and in the 
United States and a crisis of the Kemalist Etatist modernisation project in Turkey. 
The solution for the economic and political crises in question was the introduction 
of a semi-authoritarian regimes, the Thatcher government in Britain, the Reagan 
government in the United States, and the Ozal government in Turkey. When the 
1970s are considered, the economic policies pursued in Turkey and in Britain and 
the United States were different, in the Turkish case, the economic policies cannot 
be considered as the Welfare State Policies. Indeed, it was state-led growth or 
import substitution industrialisation. In Britain and the United States, the 
economic policies could only be explained with reference to the Keynesian 
Welfare State. Although, the practises of the 1970s were different, the main 
characteristic resembles. The relation between the state and the economy in the 
Welfare State and State-led economy is based on the interventionist state in the 
economy whatever the reason. Interestingly, the practises of the 1970s both differ 
and resemble.
In these three counties, names of these leaders have been associated with the years 
and even the demise of their government period. This was partly because, they 
were help strong leadership. The notion of being strong in any sense was the key 
notion. The New Right defined the problem of the 1970s with reference to the
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weakness of the social democratic state. States in the 1970s in these countries 
blamed to be too weak to resist the demands coming from interest groups. Thus, 
the New Right ideology demanded both a strong and a limited state. They have an 
Hegelian vision of a powerful sovereign state that stands above the conflict within 
the egoistic market society and impartially delivers law and order (Barry, 1987; 
194). In order for the decision making institutions to be neutral, political decision 
making process was to be centralised and revolved around one person. In the 
bureaucracy, top professional-technocrat bureaucrats having autonomy and 
capability had the autonomy.
Although, the idea of rolling back of the state from the economy was set as the 
prime important target of the Thatcher, the Reagan and the Ozal governments, the 
1980s witnessed a redirecting the state activities in the economy. The main 
argument behind limiting the state was that state should no longer support the 
labour, that is, the ‘unproductive’ sections of the society, because, the expense for 
supporting the labour is a dead investment. If the same amount, even higher 
amount of money would be allocated to private enterprise, that is, those sections 
which were potentially then the money would return back to the budget.
Economic liberalism was the most important policy plank of the ANAP 
government. Fot the ANAP, economic liberalism was very important, because it 
would pave the way for démocratisation. Political liberalisation can only be 
achieved via economic liberalisation. Parallel with the Thatcher government and
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the Reagan government, the ANAP governments considered different ideas as 
different commodities. If the consumer did not want to purchase that commodity 
then that commodity was destined to disappear from the market.
Everything in the market shared the same fate. As democracy too was considered 
from the same perspective, then freedom, equality and participation come to have 
some specific meanings. Freedom was defined as freedom to invest. Equality was 
defined as equality in opportunity. Participation could not be equated with 
demonstrations and strikes, because they were considered detrimental for the 
country since they were based on sectional interests. Participation was defined as 
participation in economic affairs. Participation of the masses in politics would 
have degenerated the neutrality of the state institutions and the decision-making 
institutions.
According to the New Right ideology, the market had its own rules; these rules 
sometimes necessitated swallowing bitter pills by the each segment of the society. 
Since the state had a superior place vis-a-vis the society, then the activities of the 
state could not be for the benefit of only one segment. The bitter pills were to be 
swallowed by everybody. In Thatcherite rhetoric this discourse took the form of 
“future benefits will follow from present suffering” or “we are only obeying the 
dictates of the science of economics”. The New Right considered political 
liberalism as a second step following the economic liberalism.
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As noted, the state in the ideology of the New Right was to play a minimal role in 
the economic domain. However, affected by the national tradition, the state in 
Turkey could not become smaller; on the contrary, the state got bigger in terms of 
public expenditure in the 1980s. The strong state tradition in Turkey, was an 
important impediment for the ANAP to achieve its objective (Heper, 1992a, 
1992b). Interestingly, in the 1980s, public expenditures in Britain and in the 
United States too went up.
Another important characteristics specific for Turkey was that, since the ANAP 
choose not to challenge the military and since the political problems of the 1970s 
were attributed to political polarisation, the Ozal government was quite inclusive 
in its discourse. Since not all political parties were allowed to compete in the 1983 
elections, a populist discourse was used in order to have the support for the 
following election at which in all probability the political parties of the 1970s 
were going to run. The discourse of the Ozal government was, therefore, 
circumstanced by such circumstances, while both the Thatcher and Reagan 
administrations were not under such constraints. The latter did not hesitate to 
exclude some segments of the society in their politics. In brief, although, the 
economic and political objectives of the three governments resembled each other, 
in practise some differences could be observed because of the specificity of the 
national circumstances.
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The Implications o f  Özalism for Turkish Polity
During the 1980s, identity politics interestingly has become important with the 
impact of the New Right ideology (Özkazanç, 1995: 1218). Rather than identities 
being defined in economic terms, cultural identities based on individualist 
methodology, have become the focal point the literature of the 1980s. That is 
because, cultural differences were reified and economic differences were 
overlooked.
One of the most significant examples of this strategy was the drastic change in the 
policies towards the Kurds. Turgut Özal took this as a cultural rather than 
economic issue. The ANAP governments perceived the Kurdish problem as that 
of demand for the recognition of specific rights. The government did not go 
further than giving some new cultural rights to the Kurds such as usage of 
Kurdish language in the public sphere. In other words the economic side of the 
problem has left untouched. Turgut Özal himself, suggested that the option of the 
federation should be debated. This should not be misunderstood as if he was for 
the federation option; but he just wanted every option to be discussed.
Other than the Kurdish problem, the Turkish public sphere was introduced with 
many new actors like environmentalists, gays and lesbians, religious people, and 
repressed women (Göle, 1992; 50). This was a new case for the Turkish politics. 
These new identities have emerged with the claim that their identities should be
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accepted as equal to the others. In the 1980s, with the help of the mass media, 
these issues became topical. Class struggle in the 1980s have become marginal 
and the discussions have twisted towards the new identities. It is claimed that 
class struggle can not be the solution for the management of the complex 
societies. Micro-scale struggles have taken the place of the macro-scale struggles. 
Therefore, the 1980s witnesses a successful attempt to diminish the potential in 
the society (Sakallıoğlu, 1995:76) via imposing imaginary struggles of identities.
The shift from the state-led growth to the market and private sector oriented 
growth considerably affected political culture. As market economy was seen so 
much indispensable that every side of life of an individual was considered as s/he 
is an entrepreneur in the market. The shift from the statist tradition to homo- 
economicus led to the insertion into political culture of such relevant values. For 
instance, the notion of “devoted to ones political ambitions /¿¿iva adamı) ” has left 
its place to the “getting things done effectively'* (işbitirici)” in evaluating the 
politicians. The latter one has become more preferable than the former one in the 
post-1980 period.
Consensus and toleration have begun to be the two defining key terms of the post- 
1980 period. Following these, criticisms towards the system as a whole have 
diminished and instead, the criticisms have been directed to individual policies.
“getting things done effectively” is the only one face of the medallion, on the other side, there is 
“getting things done at all costs”. While people do thing “effectively”, they have begun to do 
them “at all costs” . Moreover, the second way has become preferable.
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The political arena in the end has become narrower and politics has been 
understood merely administrative (Sakallioglu, 1995: 69). The New Right in 
general and the ANAP in particular presented themselves as indispensable and 
therefore, alternative-less. The New Right claims validity free from space and 
time because. Nothing can be considered wrong about a free market following its 
own rules sometimes with the aid of a neutral and impartial state.
Harmony was considered necessary for the “Great Society”. Policies between the 
1960s and the 1970s were blamed for disturbing the national harmony. The 
hegemonic ideology of the 1980s and 1990s is the idea of “the end of ideology”. 
Indeed, this is the powerful ideology to gather the each part of the society under 
one umbrella. Both in the documents of the ANAP and in the speeches of the 
party’s leaders, pragmatism rather than idealism was emphasised. Voters were 
encouraged to pay attention to such concrete policies as value-added tax, 
municipality services, Turkey-European Economic Community relations. For the 
supporters of the party, specific policies rather than ideology began to have the 
prime importance.
The effectiveness of the New Right was not because it developed a theoretically 
original and a productive point of view or it maintained functional solutions for 
the problems of the age. On the contraiy, it took the attentions away from the 
system choked by the problems, and it normalised living with the problems, and 
legitimised the insensitivity of the system towards the dissatisfactions, in that
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means, (the success of the New Right) is because it encapsulates a strong 
conservative strand providing the above provided solution to the system (Pekel, 
1994: 21). This policy could be succeeded through implying that the state and the 
economy are two separate spheres and the problems of the each sphere can only 
be solved within that sphere. Put it simply, the economic problems of the 1980s 
were not the problems of the political power since in the 1980s the state has 
became limited. This statement was the legitimising idea of the economic 
problems of the 1980s.
This study paves the way for a new study on the 1990s. a question can be asked 
after such a study; whether the 1990s represents a brake with the 1980s or the 
1990s witnessed just a change in the actor of the New Right ideology. Therefore, 
this study poses another question that is the 1980s can be explained with reference 
to the New Right then what can be the defining ideology of the 1990s in Turkish 
politics.
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